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Abortion Across State Lines 
Joseph W. Dellapenna∗ 
In the span of about a year in the mid-1990s, news media featured 
two stories about adolescent girls and abortion. In examining the some-
what sensationalized accounts of the two stories, one realizes that each 
could have been presented very differently. The first, from Nebraska, 
tells of a community strongly opposed to abortion that gathered together 
to prevent an unmarried pregnant teenager from having an abortion.1 Ac-
cording to the New York Times, the father’s family conspired with a doc-
tor, the local sheriff’s office and local police, the County Attorney, and 
the local Juvenile Court judge to deprive the girl and her family of their 
freedom to choose abortion by kidnapping the girl pursuant to a court or-
der.2 One could as easily cast the conspirators as heroes fighting to pro-
tect the rights of both the unborn child and its father by intervening to 
save the life of an unborn child in the twenty-third week of gestation—
now an infant girl described in a quotation in the New York Times as a 
“darling little baby” being raised by the parents of the unnamed teenage 
girl.3 
Pennsylvania provides a contrasting story, with the interveners on 
the side of “choice” rather than “life.” In northeastern Pennsylvania, Ro-
sa Marie Hartford was convicted of interfering with the custody of a thir-
teen-year-old girl by taking her to New York for an abortion without the 
knowledge or consent of the girl’s mother, who did not even know that 
the girl was pregnant.4 While Hartford claimed that she did so in an ef-
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 1. Tamar Lewin, Nebraska Abortion Case: The Issue is Interference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 
1995, at A8. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Marie McCullough, Woman Convicted Who Aided Abortion: She Took her Son’s 13-
Year-Old Girlfriend to New York State for the Procedure Without Parental Consent, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Oct. 30, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter McCullough, Woman Convicted]; David Stout, Woman 
Who Took Girl for Abortion Is Guilty in Custody Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at A15; see also 
Marie McCullough, Abortion Case Taps Some of Parents’ Deepest Fears, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 27, 
1996, at A1 (reporting the circumstances leading up to the conviction) [hereinafter McCulloch, 
Deepest Fears].  
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fort to help the girl, the Sullivan County District Attorney argued that 
Hartford had done so to help her nineteen-year-old son avoid a statutory 
rape conviction. 5 Despite Hartford’s efforts, the son faced a jail sentence 
of up to thirty months.6 Many people (including, apparently, the seven 
men and five women on the jury who convicted her—and a majority in 
the U.S. House of Representatives7) saw Hartford’s actions as the selfish 
exploitation of a vulnerable child and a high-handed disregard of the 
right of the child’s parent(s) to determine the medical procedures and 
cultural values that should play a role in the daughter’s life. Kathryn 
Kolbert, of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, and Hartford’s 
defense attorney, saw Hartford as a heroine who facilitated a young 
woman’s lawful choice in the face of an uncaring or even hostile world.8  
The Hartford case introduced a new element in the debate over the 
legality of abortion: Hartford had to take the girl to another state for the 
abortion. Pennsylvania has a rather strict parental notice and consent 
law,9 the constitutionality of which has been upheld by the Supreme 
Court of the United States,10 but three states that border Pennsylvania do 
not have comparable requirements.11 Thus, even when a state like Penn-
sylvania has strict parental notice and consent laws, they may be evaded 
easily in a nearby state where public authorities are sympathetic to abor-
tion rights. In another case, for example, parents in Pennsylvania sued a 
school district after a school’s guidance counselor arranged for high 
school girls to travel to New Jersey for abortions without informing their 
parents.12 The New Jersey Supreme Court had declared the state’s paren-
tal notice law unconstitutional.13 West Virginia, another state bordering 
 
 5. McCullough, Woman Convicted, supra note 4, at A1. Despite Hartford’s efforts, the son 
faced a jail sentence of up to thirty months. Id. (reporting that the son pleaded guilty to statutory rape 
and was serving a sentence of  12 to 30 months). 
 6. Id. (reporting that the son pleaded guilty to statutory rape and was serving a sentence of  
12 to 30 months). 
 7. See David E. Rosenbaum, House Passes Bill to Restrict Minors’ Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 1999, at A17. While the proposed statute was not simply a response to the Hartford case, that 
case was discussed in the debates over the proposal; efforts to enact such a statute have foundered on 
the failure of the House and Senate to agree on the precise terms of the statute, although such stat-
utes have now passed both houses of Congress. See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and 
Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1470, 1536–37 (2007). 
 8. Marie McCullough, Abortion Case Appeal Poses Conflict of Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
June 12, 1997, at B1. 
 9. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (West 2000). 
 10. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
 11. Delaware, Maryland, and New York do not require parental notice and consent. 
 12. Vanessa Dea, Abortion Debate: Do the Schools Have a Role in Counseling Girls?, EDUC. 
WEEK, Mar. 7, 2001, at 1.  
 13. Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 638 (N.J. 2000). 
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Pennsylvania, has a strong parental notice and consent statute,14 yet there 
might even have been similar evasions of Pennsylvania law there as well. 
The lack of published reports of such incidents might merely mean that 
those involved have not been caught. 
The Pennsylvania stories present what on its face is a fairly narrow, 
technical legal question: Can a state like Pennsylvania apply its laws to 
abortions involving the state’s citizens that take place outside the state? 
This question is likely to become more prominent in the future if the Su-
preme Court loosens the federal constitutional standards for abortion 
laws.15 While most readers will immediately think in terms of a possible 
criminal prosecution, as in the Hartford case, the question also implicates 
questions of civil litigation. Supporters or opponents of abortion might 
seek injunctions16 or the appointment of a guardian for the mother or the 
child, or even to bring suit for damages against the abortion provider or 
others involved in procuring the out-of-state abortion, whether for negli-
gence in performing the abortion17 or for injuring a legal right recog-
nized in one state but not in another.18 
 
 14. W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (2001) (requiring parental notification). On the constitutionality 
of such statutes under the federal constitution, see Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2006). 
 15. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting 
partial-birth abortions and distinguishing Stenberg v. Carhart); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 
930 (2000) (invalidating a Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortions for unduly burdening the 
right to choose abortion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (adopting an undue burden standard for abortion 
regulations under which laws restricting abortion after viability must include exceptions for preg-
nancies that endanger the life or health of the mother). See generally JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 
DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 932–37 (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.250(5) (West 2008) (authorizing an injunction against a 
person seeking to aid a minor in obtaining an abortion without parental consent). The constitutional-
ity of this provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732, 745 
(Mo. 2007). 
 17. For examples of malpractice actions arising from an abortion, albeit not necessarily in-
volving travel across a state line, see Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurigico, 345 F.3d 15 
(1st Cir. 2003) Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia Cnty., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989); Boykin 
v. Magnolia Bay, Inc., 570 So. 2d 639 (Ala. 1990); Perguson v. Tamis, 937 P.2d 347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1996); Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984); Adams v. Family Planning Ass’n Medical Group, 
733 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), appeal denied, 744 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. 2001); Blair v. Hutzel Hos-
pital, 552 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), rev’d mem., 569 N.W.2d 167 (Mich. 1997); Kiddy v. 
Lipscomb, 628 So. 2d 1355 (Miss. 1993); Eidson v. Reproductive Health Services, 863 S.W.2d 621 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic, 951 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1997); Ferra-
ra v. Bernstein, 613 N.E.2d 542 (N.Y. 1993); Phillips v. A Triangle Women’s Health Clinic, 573 
S.E.2d 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Hunte v. Hinkley, 731 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);  Senesac 
v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900 (Vt. 1982); Lake v. Northern Virginia 
Women’s Medical Center, Inc., 483 S.E.2d 220 (Va. 1997).  See generally Thomas Eller, Informed 
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In this article, I propose to analyze conflicts of law precedents and 
theory to explore the extent to which a state can apply its law on abortion 
to abortions performed outside the state but bearing a significant connec-
tion to the state.  In attempting to resolve such questions, we enter into 
the domain of choice of law, part of the field of conflicts of law. This 
domain is notoriously unstable and contested.19 This instability allows 
legal commentators to project their attitudes towards abortion (and many 
other matters)  analyzing and construing the relevant authorities to re-
solve choice of law issues. I shall strive to avoid doing that, but it is for 
others to decide whether I succeed.20 I begin in Part I by examining why 
differences among states regarding abortion policy arise and why those 
difference are likely to persist. I then proceed in Part II by describing 
choice of law theory generally. In Part III, I examine the application of 
choice of law theory to litigation involving differing abortion laws in dif-
ferent states. I conclude in Part IV that states can apply their laws to their 
citizens when they travel out of the state in an effort to avoid abortion re-
strictions. 
I. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER ABORTION 
Until sometime in the nineteenth or twentieth century, abortion was 
tantamount to suicide for the mother, and thus, there was little contro-
versy about prohibiting it.21 When changing medical technologies—the 
 
Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 
(1996); Tamar Lewin, Malpractice Lawyers’ New Target, MED. ECON., June 26, 1995, at 53;  
 18. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.250(2), (3) (West 2008) (imposing civil liability on per-
sons who aid a minor in obtaining an abortion without parental consent). The constitutionality of this 
provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, 220 S.W.3d 732 (Mo. 2007). See 
also Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992) (holding that a wom-
an cannot be bound to arbitrate an abortion-malpractice claim); Bickham v. Selcke, 576 N.E.2d 975 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding professional sanctions against a physician because of the negligent 
performance of an abortion); Sherman v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 670 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a 
physician’s suit against a malpractice insurer).. Products liability claims might also arise in some 
circumstances. For example, press reports have indicated that the Chinese pharmaceutical company 
that manufactures mifepristone (RU-486), an abortion-inducing drug used in the first two months of 
pregnancy, has a record of producing lethally defective versions of other drugs. Jake Hooker & Walt 
Bogdanich, Tainted Drugs Linked to Maker of Abortion Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at A1. 
While there is no evidence of such failures in the manufacture of mifepristone, if it were to happen, 
the question would arise whether a products liability claim could be maintained under a state’s laws 
and against any of several possible defendants. 
 19. See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICTS OF LAW (3d ed. 2000); RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (5th ed. 2006). 
 20. I discuss my personal attitudes towards abortion, and the bases for my personal attitudes, 
in a “personal aside” in my book on the history of abortion. DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at ix–xi. 
 21. See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 29–56. 
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development of analgesics, anesthetics, antibiotics, and antiseptics—
made abortion less dangerous for the mother and more difficult to de-
tect,22 societies around the world responded to the resulting challenges to 
social mores and legal doctrine from increasing resort to abortion. In the 
nineteenth century, nearly everyone—led by feminists, physicians, and 
religious leaders—responded by treating abortion as a legal issue, with 
legislatures around the world enacting statutes to repress or prohibit 
abortion.23 In the second half of the twentieth century, as the medical 
profession perfected techniques for doing abortions, and as many men 
and women found their personal goals to be best served by reducing or 
even eliminating the role of children in their lives, many came to prefer 
to treat abortion as a medical problem rather than to prohibit it as a legal 
problem. Legislatures in many nations, particularly industrialized na-
tions, remolded their abortion statutes to facilitate the choices of women 
(and often of their men) to abort pregnancies.24 
Yet the perceived interests of society in unborn children were also 
changing as a result of new medical information and technologies fo-
cused on human reproduction.25 This shift began early in the nineteenth 
century with the realization that a fundamental genetic transformation 
occurred at conception.26 We now know that limited fetal brain waves 
can be detected at eight weeks of gestation.27 Experimentation during 
abortions has shown that fetal brains react to morphine, scopolamine, and 
thiopental in characteristic human patterns as early as ten weeks of gesta-
tion, indicating that the early fetal brain already has drug receptors and 
synaptic transmitters capable of reacting to stimuli and of transmitting 
those reactions throughout the still immature nervous system.28 While 
fetal brains admittedly are physiologically immature, so are all human 
brains until puberty.  
Moreover, our ability to interact directly with a fetus has also ad-
vanced dramatically in recent years. Physicians now can diagnose and 
 
 22. Id. at 333–34, 350, 367, 454–59, 481–82. 
 23. Id. at 232–62, 268–370, 372–409, 412–16, 419–51. 
 24. See id. at 575–629, 722–49. 
 25. See id. at 749–69. 
 26. See id. at 256–62. See also HAROLD MOROWITZ & JAMES TREFIL, THE FACTS OF LIFE: 
SCIENCE AND THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 43–58 (1992). 
 27. Hannibal Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 JAMA, 112, 113 (1964). See also Joseph 
W. Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
379, 401–09 (1974) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Nor Piety Nor Wit]. 
 28. Nils Petter Jorgenson & Karel Marshall, Influence of Thiopental Anaesthesia on Fetal 
Motor Behaviour in Early Pregnancy, 17 EARLY HUM. DEV. 71, 77 (1988). 
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treat unborn children independently of the mother.29 A fetologist can re-
move a child from the womb for surgery and then return it to the womb 
to complete gestation, or the fetologist can perform a medical procedure 
inside the womb.30 Physicians have even observed fetuses as early as 
nine weeks in gestation covering their eyes to shield them from the bright 
lights of surgery and covering their ears to avoid loud noises in the oper-
ating room.31 In its most extreme form, physicians can sustain a wom-
an’s body after her brain has died in order to produce a healthy child.32  
Amniocentesis, amniography, embryoscopy, fetography, fetoscopy, 
radiography, ultrasound, and other techniques almost compel us to think 
about the fetus as an independent being.33 Even such apparently innocu-
ous technical developments as the ability to picture the unborn infant by 
a sonogram or to hear the child’s heart beating (today a ubiquitous ex-
perience fairly early in pregnancy) alter our relationship to the fetus and 
thus our concept of the being with which we deal.34 The effects of fetal 
medicine and fetal imaging on the meaning of pregnancy are, of course, 
not objective, yet such images have a peculiar power, as noted by rheto-
rician Celeste Condit: 
Visual forms of persuasion present special problems of analysis. Visual 
 
 29. JUDITH BOSS, THE BIRTH LOTTERY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND SELECTIVE ABORTION 
71–76 (1993); GENETIC DISORDERS AND THE FETUS: DIAGNOSIS, PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 
(Aubrey Milunsky ed., 4th ed. 1998);  THE UNBORN PATIENT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF FETAL 
DEVELOPMENT (Michael Harrison ed. 2001)  
 30. N. Scott Adzick & Michael R. Harrison, Fetal Surgical Therapy, 343 LANCET 897, 900–
901 (1994); Mitchell S. Golbus et al., In Utero Treatment of Urinary Tract Obstruction, 142 AM. J. 
OBSTET. & GYNECOLOGY 383 (1982); M.T. Longaker et al., Maternal Outcome after Open Fe tal 
Surgery, 265 JAMA 737 (1991); Sandra Blakeslee, Fetus Returned to Womb Following Surgery, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1986, at C1. 
 31. THOMAS VERNEY & JOHN KELLY, THE SECRET LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD 36–42 
(1981). See also A.W. Liley, The Fetus as a Personality, 6 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 99 (1972), 
reprinted in 1 FETAL THERAPY 8, 10, 13 (1986) (describing fetal behaviors, including movement and 
thumbsucking as early as 8 weeks of gestation). 
 32. David R. Field et al., Maternal Brain Death during Pregnancy: Medical and Ethical Is-
sues, 260 JAMA 816, 816–17 (1988). 
 33. N. Caccia et al., Impact of Prenatal Testing on Maternal-Fetal Bonding: Chorionic Villus 
Sampling Versus Amniocentesis, 165 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOLOGY 1122, 1124–25 (1991). See gen-
erally Randi Hutter Epstein, Advances, and Angst, in a New Era of Ultrasound, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
2000, at F7; E. Albert Reece et al., Embryoscopy: A Closer Look at First-Trimester Diagnosis and 
Treatment, 166 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOLOGY 775 (1992). 
 34. For examples of such images, see LANGMAN’S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 80, 82–83 (T.W. 
Sadler ed., 5th ed. 1985); Lennart Nilsson, The First Days of Creation, LIFE, Aug. 1990, at 26, 40–
43. For discussions of the power of such images, see, e.g., BOSS, supra note 29, at 65–68, 119 
(1993); DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 758–63, 767–69; ANN OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB 
155–86 (1984); John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Sounding Boards: Maternal Bonding in Early 
Fetal Ultrasound Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392–93 (1983). 
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images seduce our attention and demand our assent in a peculiar and 
gripping fashion. Many audiences are leery of verbal constructions, 
which only “represent” reality, but because we humans tend to trust our 
own senses, we take what we see to be true. Therefore our trust in what 
we see gives visual images particular rhetorical potency . . . .It is in the 
translation of visual images into verbal meanings that the rhetoric of 
images operates most powerfully.35 
Thus, when Life magazine published photos by Lennart Nilsson in 1965 
documenting fetal development through all major stages,36 just when the 
abortion reform movement was picking up steam, it spread the image of 
a fetus as a “little person” to the general public and helped fuel the anti-
abortion movement. 37 
In the United States, supporters of abortion rights grew impatient 
with the slow, difficult, and uncertain legislative process. Whereas abor-
tion laws around the world were altered legislatively, abortion supporters 
in the U.S. turned to the courts to establish a constitutional right to 
choose.38 Unlike the legislative solutions embraced in other countries, 
however, the American solution generated enormous controversy and 
even violence.39 This eventually led to the Supreme Court disavowing 
judicial micromanagement of abortion rights.40 Yet ultimately, the ma-
jority on the Court could not keep their hands off the abortion contro-
versy.41 This in turn generated even more controversy and a subsequent 
Supreme Court decision that left only confusion about the possible direc-
tion abortion laws would or could take in the near future.42 
 
 35. CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING 
SOCIAL CHANGE 81 (1990). 
 36. The Drama of Life Before Birth, LIFE, Apr. 30, 1965, at 54. 
 37. KAREN NEWMAN, FETAL POSITIONS: INDIVIDUALS, SCIENCE, VISUALITY 8–16 (1996). 
Claims, such as Susan Appleton made recently, that abortion laws are not about fetuses but about 
keeping women in their place present an ideological belief, but do not comport with the experiences 
or beliefs of those opposed to the legalization of abortion; this becomes particularly apparent when 
one examines the attitudes of nineteenth-century feminists and of nineteenth-century women physi-
cians. For Appleton’s argument, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender, Abortion, and Travel After 
Roe’s End, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 655, 660–67 (2007). See also DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 373–
406. 
 38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overruled in part); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973). See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 672–95. 
 39. DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 771–819. 
 40. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See generally 
DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 838–85. 
 41. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 932–37. 
 42. See, e.g.,Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2008 
1658 
 
In the current legal and social context, the struggle over abortion will 
likely continue. The increasingly uncertain posture of the Supreme Court 
leaves growing room for divergence among states in their laws regulating 
abortion. States have already enacted diverse laws regarding certain as-
pects of abortion,43 and these differences are only likely to increase.44 
These differences will then lead to the choice of law issues considered in 
the following section. 
II. CHOICE OF LAW GENERALLY 
We begin with the legal principles used to determine the outcome of 
civil litigation. These principles will be used to resolve civil claims relat-
ing to abortions with significant connection to more than one state. These 
principles are a convenient starting point, both because they are better 
known among lawyers and judges and because they will inform to a sig-
nificant degree the comparable principles applied in criminal cases. To-
day, choice of law in the United States for the most part remains a matter 
of state law. As a result, three different choice of law theories compete 
for acceptance: (1) a rule-centered “vested rights” approach aimed at co-
ordinating competing sovereignties; (2) a methodology-centered “interest 
analysis” aimed at coordinating social policies; and (3) a new rule-
centered “neoterritorialist” approach aimed at coordinating the parties’ 
expectations.  
In the following subsections, I briefly describe each theory and then 
discuss whether these theories should be applied in criminal prosecutions 
and the constitutional limitations on choice of law. 
A. The Vested Rights Approach to Choice of Law 
The first Restatement of Conflicts45 summarizes the vested rights 
system of choice of law. Under this system, courts first characterize the 
nature of the suit and then select the jurisdiction under whose law rights 
of that type “vest.” For example for torts, rights vest at the place where 
the injury occurred;46 for contracts, at the place where the contract was 
made, or where the contract was to be performed;47 and for property 
 
 43. On the range of legislative responses to abortion, see EVA RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, 
AND THE COURTS 126–49 (rev. ed. 1987). See also supra pp. 101-03. 
 44. DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 976–94. 
 45. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
 46. Id. §§ 377–378. 
 47. Id. §§ 332, 358. 
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rights, the location of the property at the time the rights in question 
vested.48 
Vested rights suffer from apparent rigidity from its formal reliance 
on a single factor—the state with sovereign authority over a transaction 
or event49—to select the law for every aspect of a suit. Courts developed 
a plethora of escape devices (characterization, renvoi, public policy, etc.) 
to avoid the ostensibly inexorable commands of these apparently simple 
rules in order make the system far less certain than it appears on the sur-
face, and perhaps more just.50 
B. Interest Analysis 
Over the past seventy years, American legal scholars have developed 
choice of law techniques that are both multifactoral and policy sensi-
tive.51 The resulting approach is termed interest analysis. Arguably better 
suited to coordinating policies of states within a federal union, it appears 
predominant in the United States today.52 Interest analysis comes in 
many different guises, the best known of which are Brainerd Currie’s 
“governmental interest analysis”,53 Robert Leflar’s “choice influencing 
 
 48. Id. § 208. 
 49. See, e.g., Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 808–09 (Ala. 1892) (“[E]ach sover-
eignty, state or nation, has the exclusive power to finally determine and declare what act or omis-
sions in the conduct of one to another . . . shall impose a liability in damages for the consequent in-
jury, and the courts of no other sovereignty can impute a damnifying quality to an act or omission 
which afforded no cause of action where it transpired.”). 
 50. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 119–45, 697–701; WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 19, at 52–116, 400–08; Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2455–61, 2471–76 (1999). 
 51. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
173 (1933). 
 52. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 68–102, 701–60; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 408–
22. 
 53. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1963). All modern 
choice of law theories are deeply indebted to Professor Currie. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 
N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). For approaches described 
after Currie’s death as derived from him, see Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976) 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) (overruled by statute (Business and Professions Code section 
25602)), Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 
(1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Interest Analysis] and Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Im-
pairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 
577 (1980). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 100–01, 701–25; WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 19, at 8–9, 408–21; Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2461–65, 2467–71, 2477–81; Gary J. Simson, 
New Directions in Choice of Law: Alternatives to Interest Analysis, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 195 
(1991)  
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considerations” (also known as the “better law” approach),54 Willis 
Reese’s “most significant relationship” test (also known as the “Second 
Restatement” approach),55 and Russell Weintraub’s approach, often re-
ferred to as a “functional analysis.”56 While scholars debate the fine 
points of the differences between these analyses, often with great vehe-
mence,57 in broad outline the various forms of interest analysis are actu-
ally quite similar. 
Each approach focuses on selecting the governing rule of law for a 
particular issue, and not, as under vested rights, the governing juris-
diction for the entire litigation.58 Each asks a court to begin by examin-
ing the potentially relevant formal rules of law to see if they are in fact 
different or if they would lead to different results in the case. If they are 
not different or would produce the same result if applied to the case, 
there simply is no conflict. If the formal rules of law are different or 
would lead to different results (an apparent conflict), a court then exam-
ines the policies underlying the formal rules.59 If the policy of only one 
formal rule would be affected by its application, there is a false conflict, 
and the court should apply the only relevant rule of law, described as the 
law of the only state with an interest in having its law applied.60 If the 
policies of more than one formal rule will be affected, there is a true con-
flict. On the other hand, if the policies underlying every potentially rele-
vant rule of law would not be affected by non-application, there is what 
 
 54. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL III, & ROBERT L. FELIX, AMERICAN 
CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed. 1986). This approach is best known for recommending application of the 
“better rule of law.” Id. at 297–300. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 
1974); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 
302 (1981). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 101, 725–31; WEINTRAUB, supra note 
19, at 11–12, 444–48. 
 55. Willis Reese was the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1971). Many courts have purported to apply this method. See, e.g., Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 
(N.Y. 1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng’g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967); Gutierrez v. Collins, 
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997 (Wash. 1976). See gen-
erally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 58–68, 95–100, 732–41; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 7–8, 
382–93.  
 56. See Weintraub, supra note 19, at 373–75, 522–41. See also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, 
at 43–47. 
 57. See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis or the Restatement Second of Conflicts: 
Which is the Preferable Approach to Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems?, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 73 
(1988). 
 58. See, e.g., Caruolo v. John Crane, Inc., 226 F.3d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 59. See, e.g., Dym, 209 N.E.2d at 794, overruled on other grounds Tooker v. Lopez, 249 
N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969). 
 60. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 395–96, 398–99  (N.Y. 1969). 
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has come to be called an unprovided-for case.61 Only for true conflicts or 
unprovided-for cases do the several theories posit widely differing ways 
to resolve the conflict. 
With a few exceptions, courts have not concerned themselves with 
the fine points of these various systems. Rather, courts have preferred to 
synthesize elements of the several analyses in an attempt to find the most 
relevant law for a particular issue in a case.62 Because the modern ap-
proaches depend on virtually unanswerable questions about the nature 
and weight of competing state policies, the synthesis in most courts fea-
tures a pronounced bias in favor of plaintiffs in torts—or at least a pro-
nounced bias in favor of the forum’s law, which amounts to the same 
thing if plaintiffs choose a forum because of its favorable law.63 In con-
tracts cases, the synthesis favored by the courts generally seeks to effec-
tuate the intent of the parties.64 Courts are particularly likely to follow 
the law chosen in an express choice-of-law clause.65 
Depending as it does on imponderables, interest analysis at best is 
complex, confusing, and highly unpredictable. In an occasional, surpris-
ing case, a court has favored a foreign, anti-plaintiff law for a tort despite 
 
 61. It is not at all clear that there is such a thing as an “unprovided-for case,” but the phrase is 
widely used in conflicts scholarship. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-for” Case, 75 
VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989); Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2520–25. 
 62. See, e.g., Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1998); Reyno 
v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 167–68 (3d Cir. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 454 U.S. 235 
(1981). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 79–84, 755–59; Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 
2463. 
 63. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978); Fisher v. 
Huck, 624 P.2d 177 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); see also Brilmayer, Interest Analysis, supra note 53; Willis 
L.M. Reese, American Trends in Private International Law: Academic and Judicial Manipulation of 
Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND. L. REV. 717, 727–29, 734–37 (1980); Roosevelt, su-
pra note 50, at 2464–65. 
 64. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. Kommanditge-
sellschaft v. Republic of Romania, 123 F. Supp. 2d 174, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Falcoal, Inc. v. 
Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu, 660 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Bernkrant v. Fow-
ler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 857–80; WEINTRAUB, 
supra note 19, at 481–98, 523; Reese, supra note 63, at 737. 
 65. Wallace Hardware Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382, 397–400 (6th Cir. 2000); Fina, Inc. v. 
Arco, 200 F.3d 266, 26 9–70 (5th Cir. 2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 187 (1971); Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. K/XXI.5, art. 7, reprinted in 33 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 732, 734  (1994). But 
see Krock v. Lipsay, 97 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1996); J.S. Alberici Const. Co. v. Mid-West Con-
veyor Co., 750 A.2d 518, 521 (Del. 2000). See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationaliza-
tion of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 421 (1995); Philip A. Buhler, Forum 
Selection and Choice of Law Clauses in International Contracts: A United States Viewpoint with 
Particular Reference to Maritime Contracts and Bills of Lading, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 
(1995). 
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apparent general preference for a plaintiff-favoring, forum-favoring in-
terest analysis.66 Similarly, courts have held contracts invalid on dubious 
grounds in an occasional case despite the usual preference for validity.67 
Some courts have applied interest analysis to such areas as property or 
family law, although for these areas, courts tend more strongly to stay 
with the traditional system for choice of law.68 The complexity and un-
certainty of interest analysis makes it an ideal escape device. A court can 
justify using any law it wants without resort to traditional escape de-
vices,69 and thus the traditional escape devices have tended to atrophy or 
even disappear under interest analysis in favor of result-oriented applica-
tion of interest analysis—essentially, interest analysis is an ad hoc ap-
proach to each case.70 
C. The Neoterritorialist Approach 
Some state courts have rejected interest analysis because of its inher-
ent uncertainty.71 They have continued to apply the vested rights or “ter-
ritorialist” approach despite the rigidities and other difficulties in that 
system.72 Some courts and scholars, disillusioned with both vested rights 
(too rigid) and interest analysis (too whimsical), have attempted to de-
velop yet a third approach that attempts to combine what are arguably the 
 
 66. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 729  (Cal. 1978); Dym v. 
Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967). 
 67. See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1983); Lilien-
thal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). 
 68. See, e.g., Carter v. Sandberg, 458 A.2d 924 (N.J. Super. 1983) (property); In re Lenherr’s 
Estate, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974) (marriage). 
 69. Compare Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Washington’s 
statute of limitations to a case brought in a Washington court), with Henry v. Richardson-Merrell 
Co., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying Quebec’s statute of limitations to a case brought in a New 
Jersey court), and Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 1973) (applying North Carolina’s 
statute of limitations to a case brought in a New Jersey court). Compare Martineau v. Guertin, 751 
A.2d 776 (Vt. 2000) (applying Vermont law to case brought in a Vermont court), with Myers v. 
Langlois, 721 A.2d 129 (Vt. 1998) (using a “most significant relationship” test to apply Quebec law 
to a case brought in a Vermont court). 
 70. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 755–60; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 373–74, 421–
33; Reese, supra note 63, at 720–30; Simson, supra note 53, at 195.  
 71. See, e.g., Braxton v. Anco Elec., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 914, 915 (N.C. 1991); Boudreau v. 
Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853–54 (N.C. 1988). 
 72. See, e.g., Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844–45 (7th Cir. 1999); Philip 
Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 231 (Md. 2000); BHP Petrol. (Americas), Inc. v. Texaco 
Exploration & Prod., Inc., 1 P.3d 1253 (Wyo. 2000). 
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best points of both systems.73 This new approach is the “neoterritorialist” 
approach. 
Under the neoterritorialist approach, courts are expected to work out 
territorially centered rules that are more narrowly drawn than the rules 
for vested rights. As the rules are more narrowly drawn, they, like inter-
est analysis, are more sensitive to the policies at stake for particular is-
sues and therefore presumably are more just. Yet, being based on territo-
rially sensitive rules, the approach is expected to be more predictable 
than interest analysis has proven to be. Furthermore, neoterritorialism 
stresses the expectations of the parties, even in torts cases, rather than 
guessing about the policies underlying competing laws.74 Neoterritorial-
ism localizes these expectations differently for rules meant to regulate 
conduct (“admonitory rules,” which turn on where the regulated conduct 
occurs) and rules meant to allocate the financial consequences of an act 
or event (“compensatory rules,” which turn the relation of the act or 
event to the domiciles of the parties).75  
Specific neoterritorialist rules have not been accepted outside the fo-
rum that created them.76 Thus, consensus exists only at a high level of 
generality, particularly as so many rules of law are simultaneously both 
admonitory and compensatory, as those terms are used in neoterritorial-
ism. Supporters of “neoterritorialism” have felt obliged to accept the 
possibility of displacing their rules in unspecified cases. A residual inter-
est analysis remains their major escape device.77 
 
 73. See Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); First Nat’l Bank in Fort 
Collins v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856–57 (Pa. 
1970). See generally David Cavers, The Choice of Law Process 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1965); 
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761–97; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 426–48; Reese, supra note 
63, at 730–34. 
 74. See Rostek, 514 P.2d at 320; Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972); 
Cipolla, 267 A.2d at 856–57. See also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761–97; WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 19, at 426–32; Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of 
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). The relevance of the parties’ expectations in torts cases is em-
phatically denied under interest analysis. Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 399 (N.Y. 1969). 
 75. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685, 692–94 (N.Y. 1985). See 
generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 761–66; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 471–73; John T. 
Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice-of-Law, 36 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 425 (2003). 
 76. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 426–33; Reese, supra note 63, at 734–37. 
 77. See Anderson v. SAM Airlines, 939 F. Supp. 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Towley v. King Ar-
thur Rinks, Inc., 351 N.E.2d 728 (N.Y. 1976); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 
1972). 
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D. Choice of Law in Criminal Matters 
The foregoing discussion of the so-called conflicts revolution on its 
face has little to do with laws making abortion a crime. It is commonly 
believed that choice of law theory does not apply to criminal matters. 
This view likely arose because a criminal court will always apply its own 
substantive law of crimes, and if it does not have legislative jurisdiction 
to apply its own law to a criminal case, it will dismiss the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.78 So strong is this tradition that foreign laws 
or judgments that are deemed to be penal “in the international sense” will 
not be recognized or enforced in the United States.79 
While this is true, it begs the question of whether a state or nation 
has legislative jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction to prescribe the law appli-
cable to an action or an event.80 This is a question that choice of law the-
ory seeks to resolve in the several approaches to civil litigation. It is also 
a question that, as regards the application of public law such as criminal 
law, has been addressed more pointedly in international conflicts of law 
than in the interstate conflicts of law on which most courts and scholars 
have focused their attention. Many scholars have asserted over the years 
that limitations under international litigation regarding legislative juris-
diction (“jurisdiction to prescribe”)81 are fundamentally different from 
the limitations applied in wholly domestic contexts.82  
 
 78. See In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 267–68 (1890); State v. Harvey, 730 S.W.2d 271, 278–
79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Fuller, 586 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367–68 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 
605 N.E.2d 880 (N.Y. 1992). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1986). The criminal cases do not seem to use the phrase “legisla-
tive jurisdiction,” but it has been used in civil cases. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 
U.S. 145, 156 (1932). The phrase seems to explain the point of the criminal cases. See Donald H. 
Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1892–95 (1987). 
 79. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 682–683 (1892). 
 80. See Appleton, supra note 37, at 667 (“Despite our intuitive resistance to the notion that a 
state can stretch its criminal prohibitions beyond its borders to reach conduct that is lawful where 
performed, legal authority does not conclusively bear out the underlying intuitions.”). On the reach 
of legislative jurisdiction, see infra pp. 1666-73.  
 81. The phrase “legislative jurisdiction” is used in the Restatement of Conflicts, while the 
phrase “jurisdiction to prescribe” is used in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 cmt. b (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1987); see also Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978). 
 82. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 307–09 (discussing “jurisdictional reasonableness” 
in denying jurisdiction in foreign cases); WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 120–21; Frederick K. 
Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Communities: A Comparison, 
82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203, 1210–1211 (1984). 
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Yet the fact remains that for the most part, the entire field of con-
flicts of law—including choice of law theory—developed in the United 
States through the application of principles borrowed from international 
law to the interstate context.83 Today, there is a good deal of controversy 
over recourse to international legal sources for interpreting the U.S. Con-
stitution.84 Justice Antonin Scalia has led the charge against recourse to 
international legal sources, yet even Justice Scalia relies on principles of 
international law to decide choice of law questions.85 
The different vocabulary used in international law makes recourse to 
the relevant body of international legal principles more difficult. That 
vocabulary has largely been reserved for diplomacy and other interna-
tional discourse, appearing in American judicial opinions only in occa-
sional and rare criminal cases or in quasi-criminal proceedings such as 
antitrust, and then only when the central events occurred outside the 
United States.86 A close look reveals the utility of the international prin-
 
 83. See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 579–82 (1906) (applying international law 
to determine whether there is an obligation to recognize a foreign divorce); Huntington v. Attrill, 
146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892) (holding that the question of what laws or judgments are “penal” is “not 
one of local, but of international law”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]xcept as re-
strained and limited by [the Constitution, States] possess and exercise the authority of independent 
States, and the principles of public law…are applicable…to them.”); D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 
(11 How.) 165, 174–76 (1850) (applying the “well established rules of international law” to deter-
mine when a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our 
International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 50–54 (2006); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–1972 
(1997). 
 84. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. & 
Thomas, J., dissenting) (denouncing recourse to international legal sources as a device for interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution). See also Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a 
“Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in 
Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Su-
preme Court, 2004 Term: Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005). 
 85. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 2117, 2123–25 (1988). 
 86. Crimes: United States v. Pizzarusso, 338 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1968). Antitrust: Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Co., 370 U.S. 
690 (1962); Laker Airways Ltd. v. SABENA, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Australian Gillian Triggs has expressed con-
siderable doubt about whether international standards apply to civil matters. Gillian Triggs, An In-
ternational Convention on Sovereign Immunity? Some Problems in Application of the Restrictive 
Rule, 9 MONASH U. L. REV. 74, 96–98 (1982). But see von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 
(D.D.C. 1985) (applying the principles of international jurisdiction to a civil case), vacated on other 
grounds, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); 5 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 216–19 (many vols. 1967–1985); 6 WHITEMAN, supra, at 88–183; Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond 
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ciples in interstate conflicts of legislative jurisdiction (“jurisdiction to 
prescribe”) over possible crime. 
The four traditional headings of jurisdiction to prescribe recognized 
in international law are:87 the territorial principle; the personality (or na-
tionality) principle;88 the protective principle; and the universality prin-
ciple. 
The Territorial Principle: When the territorial principle is invoked 
because the subject of the action in question (in the grammatical sense of 
the word “subject”) is located within the state at the time of the action, 
jurisdiction to prescribe is accepted everywhere; in fact, “subjective terri-
torial jurisdiction” is considered the primary form of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe in public law.89 In contrast, claims of jurisdiction to prescribe be-
cause the object of the action (in the grammatical sense of the word 
“object”) is located in the state—that is, when the act occurs outside the 
state but causes a significant effect within the state—are often controver-
sial.90 “Objective territorial jurisdiction” has nonetheless been applied 
broadly, evoking the greater part of international jurisdictional contro-
versies.91  
These controversies are not actually over the basic concept of objec-
tive territorial jurisdiction, but rather over a narrower class of claims to 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe. No state disputes a claim of jurisdiction 
when an action abroad causes a serious tangible effect in the state claim-
 
National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic 
Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373 (1995). 
 87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 404, 423 (1987). 
 88. This principle is usually referred to as the nationality principle, but in order to make the 
import of this principle clear, I prefer the term “personality principle.” Phrasing it this way makes it 
unnecessary to develop a supposedly separate principle known as the “passive personality” principle 
and shows how this principle actually relates to other principles of legislative jurisdiction. For cases 
listing the passive personality principle as a separate principle, see Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10 n.5; 
Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885. See infra pp.1669-71. 
 89. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“But the gen-
eral and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined 
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 402(1) (1987); Gerhard Kegel & Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern (Joseph J. Darby 
trans.), On the Territorial Principle in Public International Law, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 245 (1982). 
 90. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (dictum); United States v. Ricardo, 
619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 403 rep. note 3 (1987). 
 91. See, e.g., M.A. Blythe, The Extraterritorial Impact of the Anti-trust Laws: Protecting 
British Trading Interests, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 99 (1983); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extra-
territorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y IN INT’L BUS. 1 (1992); Russell J. Weintraub, The 
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a 
“Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (1992). 
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ing legislative jurisdiction.92 When the effect in the forum is intangible 
or insubstantial, however, other states sometimes go to extreme lengths 
to block the claim of jurisdiction.93 Attempts to ameliorate controversy 
by asserting objective territorial jurisdiction only if an effect was in-
tended by the actor94 have failed to solve the problem because they mis-
construe its nature. The controversy only partly concerns fairness to the 
defendant; it centers on the clash of important social policies between the 
nation where the action occurred and the nation where the effect was felt, 
and—on the propriety of applying the forum state’s substantive law to 
the act.95 Recently, a bare majority of the Supreme Court has tended to-
wards asserting national interest without regard to the concerns of or ef-
fects on other nations.96 Other nations, naturally, protest this approach.97 
Whether, or the extent to which, the Supreme Court of the United States 
would accept such a unilateralist attitude in assertions of jurisdiction be-
tween states of the United States is at the least an open question.98 
 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); United States v. 
Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358–59 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 93. See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 s. 8 (UK) (barring cooperation 
with the exercise of jurisdiction by American courts in anti-trust cases) ; Kay Bushman, The British 
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980: An Analysis, 14 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 253 (1980). Despite 
the objections of the British government to U.S. claims to apply objective territorial jurisdiction to 
anti-trust claims, the British have applied their criminal law to crimes no more tangible than at-
tempted fraud where the targeted property was located in England. Dir. of Public Prosecutions v. 
Stonehouse, [1978] A.C. 55 (H.L. 1977); Regina v. Baxter, [1972] 1 Q.B. 1; see also Diamond v. 
Bank of London & Montreal Ltd., [1979] 1 Q.B. 333. British courts also have refused to apply their 
law to fraud in England if the targeted property was located abroad. Regina v. Governor of Penton-
ville Prison, 71 Crim. App. 241 (1980). See also Juenger, supra note 82. 
 94. See Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128–29; Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429–30. 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403, 414, 415, 416 (1987); 
see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993). Compare Laker Airways 
Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) with British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 
[1983] 1 Q.B. 142, vacated, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.). See generally Paul Schiff Berman, A Plu-
ralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316–19 (2007) (discussing the clash 
of policies involved in conflicts between applicable laws and judgments in the international legal 
system, with particular emphasis on the conflicts created by differing laws and policies applicable to 
the internet). 
 96. See e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798–99. (“We have no need in this litigation to ad-
dress other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity.”) 
 97. For example, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher repeatedly and personally intervened 
with President Ronald Reagan about the case of Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909, until the US govern-
ment brokered a settlement. See GEOFFREY SMITH, REAGAN AND THATCHER 141–44, 164–65 
(1991). See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Jurisdictional Conflict in Global Antitrust Enforcement, 
16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 365 (2004); Alexander Layton & Angharad M. Parry, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: European Responses, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309 (2004). 
 98. See infra the pp. 1672-82. 
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The Nationality/Personality Principle: Jurisdiction to prescribe 
based on the nationality of the actor (the “active personality”) has long 
been recognized everywhere.99 American courts have occasionally ap-
plied this principle in state and federal prosecutions.100 If the claim of 
jurisdiction is based upon the nationality of the person acted upon (the 
“passive personality principle”), the claim clearly crosses the line beyond 
which a claim of jurisdiction becomes insupportable. Such claims are 
almost universally rejected.101 Even countries, like France, that routinely 
assert passive personality jurisdiction object vehemently when other 
countries assert this jurisdiction against them.102  
For at least a century, the U.S. government consistently opposed the 
passive personality theory.103 One federal court expressly rejected the 
 
 99. See, e.g., State v. Bacon, 112 A. 682, 683 (Del. 1920) (finding a defendant guilty in the 
state of Delaware for a bigamous marriage performed in another state); Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. 
App. 289, 305 (1882) (“We can see no valid reason why the Legislature of the State of Texas could 
not assert . . . her jurisdiction over wrongs and crimes . . . no matter whether the perpetrator of the 
crime was at the time of its consummation within or without her territorial limits.”); Commonwealth 
v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 173 (1819) (conferring jurisdiction for treason committed out of 
the state); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987); MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 1.03(1)(f), (2) (1962); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 336–39; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, 
at 209–11; Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, Normative, and Institutional 
Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 51 ST. L.U.L.J. 713, 719–22 (2007) 
(“[C]itizenship on its own has virtually sufficed to give the home state sufficient interest to regulate 
its citizens’ out-of-state activities for purposes of the Due Process Clause.”) [hereinafter Rosen, 
“Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?]; Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in 
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 871–76 (2002) (“This is not to suggest that citizen-
ship on its own justifies regulation.”) [hereinafter Rosen, Extraterritoriality]. 
 100. For cases applying federal law to U.S. citizens while abroad, see Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433–34 (1932). See also 
Stephen Labaton, Fischer Is Indicted over Chess Match, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A3. For cases 
applying state law to the state’s citizens while outside the state, see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 
77 (1941); Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337, 339–40 (5th Cir. 1967); F/V American Eagle v. State, 
620 P.2d 657, 662–63 (Alaska 1980); People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d 1279, 666–67 (Cal. 1980). 
 101. See generally The SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. e (1987); HOWARD S. LEVIE, 
TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 231 (1993) (noting that passive personality has 
“long been an extremely controversial principle”); Juenger, supra note 82, at 1204–05, 1210–11.  
 102. See generally Eric Cafritz & Omar Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The 
Passive Personality Principle, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 585 (2003). 
 103. See The Cutting Case, 1887 FOR. REL. 751 (1888), reported in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (1906) (asserting that Mexico does not have jurisdiction over 
authors publishing criticisms in U.S. newspapers); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987); Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition 
and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 4 UTAH L. REV. 685, 715 (1984) [hereinafter Blakes-
ley, Conceptual Framework] (“The passive personality theory of jurisdiction is generally considered 
to be anathematic to United States law.”); Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over 
Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1114–17 (1982) [hereinafter Blakes-
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principle as applicable in the United States.104 In response to the growing 
problem of international terrorism, however, the executive branch em-
braced the theory of passive personality in the mid-1980s.105 Subse-
quently, Congress enacted anti-terrorism statutes that appear to be based 
on the passive personality principle.106  
Changing executive and legislative attitudes toward the passive per-
sonality principle have led U.S. courts to apply the passive personality 
principle where authorized by statute.107 Several federal courts have re-
cently accepted the legitimacy of the passive personality principle in dic-
ta.108 Whether those courts will apply the principle in other contexts or 
 
ley, Extraterritorial Crime]; Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 4–9 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the passive personality principle in the United States). 
 104. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]hat an act af-
fects the citizen of a state is not a sufficient basis for that state to assert jurisdiction over the act.”); 
see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 
1980), aff’d on other grounds, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
 105. Watson, supra note 103, at 9–10 (“During the 1980s the United States continued to inch 
toward passive personality jurisdiction over terrorist crimes.”); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Fight-
ing Terrorism through Law, 85 STATE DEP’T BULL. 38, 41–42 (1985) (arguing for greater enforce-
ment measures to be taken aginast terrorism). See generally Elizabeth Bowen, Comment, Jurisdic-
tion over Terrorists Who Take Hostages: Efforts to Stop Terror-Violence against United States 
Citizens, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 153, 179–87 (1987). 
 106. See 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2008) (the Sabotage Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2008) (the Hostage 
Taking Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2008) (the Anti-Terrorism Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2008) (the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). See generally S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: 
A Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1264–77 (2000); Bowen, supra note 105, at 198–202 (“The 
willingness of Congress to include the passive personality principle of jurisdiction indicates the in-
creasing acceptability of the principle’s application to international terrorist attacks on civilians be-
cause of their nationality.”). The war on terror has generated more support for the application of the 
passive personality principle. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Countering Nuclear Terrorism: A 
Conventional Response, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 225, 239 (2007) (“Though passive personality remains 
controversial, as a jurisdictional principle it applies to terrorism and other organized attacks against a 
state’s nationals by reason of their nationality.”). 
 107. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 
(1998); United States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1996). See generally Abraham Abra-
movsky, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The United States’ Unwarranted Attempt to Alter Interna-
tional Law in United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 121 (1990); Joshua Robinson, Note, 
United States Practice Penalizing International Terrorists Needlessly Undercuts Its Opposition to 
the Passive Personality Principle, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 487, 500–04 (1998). 
 108. See United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing in the alternative 
that jurisdiction lay over a non-citizen accused of having sex with an underage American citizen 
even while on a foreign-flag ship on the high seas); United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 
1308 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 853 (1999) (discussing the passive personality as a 
possible alternative ground, but applying territorial jurisdiction); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 189, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing passive personality an alternate holding of juris-
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whether the executive branch will accept its application against the Unit-
ed States remains unclear.109 The presumption that, absent express lan-
guage to the contrary, acts of Congress are intended to have effect only 
within the territory of the United States is perhaps enough to answer the 
question in the negative.110 In international terms, the different treatment 
given acts where a claim of jurisdiction is based on the location of the 
effect or on the person affected reflects both the greater likelihood of a 
defendant being surprised by application of the law of the victim’s state 
(suppose one is involved in a traffic accident in the United States with a 
car that turns out to be driven by a French citizen), and the lesser degree 
of intrusion into the interests of a state by an act affecting an absent na-
tional compared to an act intruding into the territory of the state and the-
reby threatening to affect the whole community.  
The Protective and Universality Principles: The last two headings of 
jurisdiction to prescribe—the protective principle and the universality 
principle—turn upon the nature of the act in question rather than on the 
location of the action or its effect or citizenship of the persons involved. 
In other words, when an act strongly affects significant interests of a 
state, the act itself justifies a state in exercising jurisdiction regardless of 
where the act occurs or by whom it is done. The protective principle al-
lows jurisdiction over acts that threaten the integrity or security of the 
state itself; examples include espionage, counterfeiting, perjury, or inter-
ference with governmental operations.111 The universality principle al-
 
diction over a non-citizen accused of bombing U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania); United 
States v. Roberts, 1 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606–07 (E.D. La. 1998) (discussing in the alternative that juris-
diction lay over a non-citizen accused of having sex with an underage American citizen even while 
on a foreign-flag ship on the high seas); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 n.5 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981) (discussing in the alternative that jurisdiction lay over a non-citizen for the murder of U.S 
congressman at Jonestown, Guyana), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 
(1981).  
 109.  Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 185 n.17 (3d Cir. 1995) (acknowl-
edging that the passive personality principle has not been accepted for ordinary torts or crimes); 
United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); In re Ahmad, 726 F. 
Supp. 389, 398–99 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990) (accept-
ing application of the passive personality principle when asserted by a foreign state as a basis for 
extradition); In re Extradition of Demjanjuck, 612 F. Supp. 544, 558 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (alternative 
holding). See  Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of 
the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 177, 204–07 
(1997).  
 110. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989). 
 111. Estey, supra note 109, at 199–204;  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ 402(3) (1987); see also, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts done outside a 
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in 
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in 
getting him within its power.”); United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811–812 (4th Cir. 1972) (ap-
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lows jurisdiction over acts so universally viewed as heinous that the actor 
is subject to punishment by any state that obtains custody of the actor, 
although arguably the law to be applied is international law rather than 
the law of any particular state.112 Controversy is also characteristic of 
such claims of jurisdiction. In accepting or opposing these extraterritorial 
forms of jurisdiction, a state must balance the achievement of its own or 
other states’ substantive policies against the risk of surprise in exercising 
jurisdiction over people acting abroad in the reasonable belief that they 
can be held accountable only under the law of the state where they act or 
of which they are citizens, in a forum to which they have significant 
ties.113 
The principles that delineate jurisdiction to prescribe in the interna-
tional arena have been applied in U.S. courts in appropriate cases.114 
There is little precedent for applying these principles to resolve the legis-
lative jurisdiction of state courts intent on enforcing their criminal laws. 
Yet the fact is that most traditional rules and principles of conflicts of 
 
plying the protective principle to uphold jurisdiction over a person who falsifieds official documents 
outside the prosecuting jurisdiction); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(holding that the perjurious statements by an alien before a United States consular officer in a for-
eign country constitutes a pursuable crime). See IAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION passim (1994). 
 112. War crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes against peace: Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 (1948); Charter of the International Military 
Tribunals, 59 STAT. 1544 (1945); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1946); Daliberti v. Iraq, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 38, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2000); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 287–98 (Israel 
1962). Air or sea piracy: 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(38), 1472; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, entered into force for 
the U.S. Jan. 26,1973, 24 UST 564, TIAS no. 7570 (1973); Convention for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 
14, 1971, 22 UST 1641, TIAS no. 7192 (1971); Convention on the High Seas, arts. 14–22, opened 
for signature April 29, 1958, entered into force for the U.S. Sept. 30, 1962, 13 UST 2312, TIAS no. 
5200, 450 UNTS 82 (1962). .Attacks on diplomats: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1201 (2008); Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 14, 1973, entered into force for the U.S. Feb. 20, 1977, 28 UST 1975, TIAS no. 8532 
(1977); Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 736 
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08 (5th 
ed. 1998); Estey, supra note 109, at 195–99. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO et al., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001); Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A 
Weapon for All Nations Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U.- DET. C.L. J. INT’L L. 1 (2000). 
 113. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–95 (1980); Kulko v. 
Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92–98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207–09, 214–16 (1977). 
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 403, 421(1), 431(1) (1987). 
 114. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968); Rivard v. United States, 
375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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law applied in interstate settings in the United States were derived from 
the analogous rules and principles applied internationally.115 These prin-
ciples directly address whether a court has jurisdiction to apply its own 
law to an alleged crime—precisely the problem courts confront in deter-
mining whether to try a criminal case that has significant extraterritorial 
elements. Instead of relying on these principles, American courts have 
sought to resolve these questions through application of various provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States.116 These international 
principles could be used even more widely because they do not contra-
dict the holdings of the interstate cases, but supplement them in a way 
that could clarify the often confusing and uncertain language of such de-
cisions. 
E. Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law 
Several constitutional provisions play a role in shaping or limiting 
state (and possibly other) choice of law rules or principles. The primary 
constitutional provisions that limit state choices of law are the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause,117 the Due Process Clause,118 and the Commerce 
Clause.119 Space does not allow an extended analysis of these provisions, 
but one must have some minimal familiarity with these provisions to un-
derstand whether a state could apply its laws in civil or criminal litigation 
to abortions that occur outside the state. 
If a choice must be made between the laws of different states in the 
United States, the Constitution appears to address the problem directly in 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in 
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
 
 115. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 18–22. Compare Justice Holmes’ discussion of the 
theory of “obligatio” in Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904), with the theories in 
Alabama Great S. R.R.. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805–09 (Ala. 1892). Compare also Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 405–07 (1930); with N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1918). 
See generally Cavers, supra note 51, at 177; Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, 
and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451  (2000) (explaining the gradual changes from more inde-
pendent sovereign states that based relationships on more international principles, to the more inter-
dependent states of today with, but with the same relationship structure). 
 116. See infra pp. 1672-82. 
 117. See infra pp. 1674–79. 
 118. See infra pp. 1679–82. 
 119. See infra pp. 1688, 1691–93. 
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the Effect thereof.”120 The Full Faith and Credit Clause does little to 
constrain the free-wheeling choice of law process as a matter of state 
law. Today, the clause rarely will dictate a choice among the laws of 
those states or prohibit certain choices of law.  
Early in the twentieth century, after more than a century of neglect, 
the Supreme Court did begin to find particular choices mandated by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.121 The Court construed the command to 
give each state “full faith and credit” to the “public acts” of every other 
state as a requirement that state courts must apply the law of the state that 
the Court deemed appropriate. Despite recurring challenges to the his-
torical accuracy of the theory, the Court continues to accept it.122 Yet the 
Court is divided over when states are compelled to apply the law of other 
states, and how to select the appropriate state law which must be applied.  
The early cases seemed to enshrine the vested rights approach123 in 
the Constitution, the proper application of which would be assured by the 
Supreme Court’s supervision of state choices of law. Contracts were held 
 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Congress has implemented this provision through 28 U.S.C. § 
1738 (2008). When the choice is between state or federal law, the governing provision is the su-
premacy clause: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. 
art. VI. 
 121. See Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 540–47 (1915); West-
ern Un. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 258–61 
(1912). But see Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); Union Trust Co. v. 
Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 417 (1918); Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (treating choice of 
law as a question purely of state law).  
 122. All eight participating Justices endorsed this proposition in both Phillips Petrol. Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) and in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981). For 
historical criticism, see ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD P. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF 
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1223–30 (1965); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments 
and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 55–80 (1957). Bill Crosskey asserted that the requirement of 
“full faith and credit” to “records” is the source of the obligation of each state to apply the law of 
another state. WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 545–47 (1953). Others 
challenge the historical accuracy of this view. See Nadelmann, supra, at 44, 66. Crosskey’s view at 
least deals with the problem of how a mandate to respect the “public acts” (apparently statutes) of 
another state comes to be a mandate to respect another state’s common law. This last problem has 
never been dealt with adequately by proponents of the “public acts” theory. See Ralph U. Whitten, 
The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12 MEMPHIS ST. L. 
REV. 1, 56–60 (1981); VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra, at 1243–44; Robert H. Jackson, Full 
Faith and Credit–The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1945); Na-
delmann, supra, at 71–80.  
 123. See supra pp. 1658–59. 
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to be governed by the law of the state in which they were made;124 torts 
by the law of the state where the injury occurred;125 and the internal af-
fairs of corporations by the law of the place of incorporation.126 These 
decisions evoked scathing criticism from many as overly rigid and arbi-
trary,127 and this approach the Court eventually abandoned this ap-
proach.  
The vested rights approach to full faith and credit was predicated on 
the assumption that for any given transaction or event there was one, and 
only one, body of law that could properly be applied. If this assumption 
had continued, none of the modern experiments in choice of law theories 
could have been possible. The Supreme Court repudiated this assumption 
in two cases in the 1930s.128 The Court, in opinions by Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone, decided that worker’s compensation could be governed both 
by the law of the state where the contract of employment was made and 
by the law of the state where the employee was injured. Through these 
cases, the Supreme Court made it clear that the law of any significantly 
interested state could be applied regardless of whether it was the most 
significantly interested.129 In other words, full faith and credit serves on-
ly to prohibit a court from applying the law of a state that has “no legiti-
mate interest in its application.”130 
Because of the Supreme Court’s current narrow construction of the 
Full Faith and Credit clause, choice among the laws of several interested 
states is left to each state to decide for itself. In short order, the Court 
swept aside virtually all the older cases announcing a constitutionally 
compelled choice of a particular state’s law were swept aside.131 The on-
 
 124. See John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936); Bradford Elec. 
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1932). 
 125. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 546–47 (1914).  
 126. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 606–08 (1947); Bro-
derick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642–45 (1935); Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 
U.S. 531, 543–44 (1915); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260–61 (1912); Finney v. Guy, 189 
U.S. 335, 340–42 (1903). 
 127. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 145–69; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 290; Jack-
son, supra note 122, at 26–28. 
 128. See Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500–01 (1939), over-
ruling Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 544, 550 (1935). 
 129. See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1955); Watson v. Employers’ Liab. 
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72–74 (1954). 
 130. CURRIE, supra note 53, at 271. 
 131. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964); Carroll, 349 U.S. at 408; 
Watson, 348 U.S. at 66; Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Hoopeston Canning 
Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1942). 
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ly state choice of law decision reversed by the Supreme Court between 
1939 and 1985 involved the internal affairs of a fraternal benefit soci-
ety,132 and even this reversal has been questioned by well regarded 
scholars.133 Even an apparent attempt by Congress to restore the 
pre-1939 view that full faith and credit mandated application of the sin-
gle “proper law” to any given case134 failed to reverse the Supreme 
Court’s abandonment of responsibility for policing state choices of law.  
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,135 the Court surprised nearly 
everyone by agreeing to hear its first full faith and credit challenge to a 
state choice of law in seventeen years. Although all eight of the partici-
pating Justices agreed that full faith and credit continued to constrain 
state-to-state choice of law, they split three ways on the appropriate stan-
dards and on whether the standards, whatever they were, had been vio-
lated. The Minnesota Supreme Court had applied its own law to the suit 
because it was the “better rule”—even though no substantial interest of 
Minnesota was implicated, and even though no relevant policy of Minne-
 
 132. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624–25 (1947). One 
might add the escheat cases, but these involved original actions in the Supreme Court between states 
for which federal common law better explains the outcome than full faith and credit. See also Penn-
sylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); SCOLES ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 159 n.18; Willis L.M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of 
Public Policy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 342 (1952); WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 637 n.73, 665. 
 133. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 665–68. Many critics attempt to limit the deci-
sion by viewing it as applying only to fraternal benefit societies rather than to all corporations. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS introductory note to Ch. 13 (1971); SCOLES ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 159 n.18, 1102–03 n.1; Willis L.M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law Gov-
erning Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1118, 1131 (1958). Some have challenged the view that there is a broader “internal affairs” rule 
applicable to all corporations. See Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859–60 (Cal. 
App. 3d 1982); VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 122, at 1248–52; WEINTRAUB, supra, at 
670–71 n.228; Elvin Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 143–45 (1955). See 
generally John Hugh Newman, Note, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 HASTINGS 
L.J. 119 (1976). The Supreme Court, however, has reconfirmed the “internal affairs” rule at least in 
dictum. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); Regan, supra note 78, at 1875–76. 
 134. Congress added “public acts” to the statute prescribing the manner and effect of full faith 
and credit in 1948. 62 STAT. 947, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). Before 1948, the statute re-
quired full faith and credit only for “records and judicial proceedings.” See 28 U.S.C § 687 (1940).  
Some have suggested this addition is controlling. See Carroll, 349 U.S. at 422 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613–14 n.16 (1951). Note that the majority in Carroll sim-
ply disregarded Justice Frankfurter’s argument. Generally the addition has been viewed as both 
vague and more or less accidental. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 680–82; Herbert F. Goodrich, 
Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 881, 891 
(1950); Whitten, supra note 122, at 60–62.  
 135. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
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sota law would be advanced through its application.136 Only three Jus-
tices were persuaded, however, that Minnesota had applied the law of a 
state with no substantial interest.137 A plurality of four Justices appar-
ently renounced the requirement of a substantial interest in the state 
whose law was chosen.138 Rather they found it adequate that Minnesota 
had “substantial contacts” with the litigation even though those contacts 
did not relate to the policies of the law that was applied. Most troubling 
about this plurality opinion was that the four Justices themselves noted 
that each of the contacts by itself was essentially irrelevant to choice of 
the proper law.139 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, did not even 
attempt to explain how three individually irrelevant contacts add up to a 
“significant aggregation of contacts.”140 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in an individual concurrence, found no vi-
olation of full faith and credit because he saw no attack on Wisconsin’s 
sovereignty from application of Minnesota law to the case—although he 
expressly declared that Minnesota’s use of its own law was wrong as a 
matter of sound choice of law theory.141 Just how far Stevens’ approach 
could take a court is illustrated in Nevada v. Hall,142 where California 
was not only allowed to apply its own law to determine the extent, if any, 
of Nevada’s sovereign immunity for an accident in California involving 
an employee of the state of Nevada, but the Court dismissed in a footnote 
any restraint derived from the mutual respect due between coequal sov-
ereigns. 
Fairness to the defendant hardly seemed to count for more in the ap-
proaches supported by the majority Justices. They were content to dis-
miss claims of unfairness by the question begging observation that a de-
 
 136. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43, 48–49 (Minn. 1978), aff’d, 449 U.S. 302 
(1981). 
 137. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 332–40 (Powell, J., dissenting with Berger, C.J., & Rehnquist, 
J.). 
 138. See id. at 305–20 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion with Blackmun, Marshall, & White, JJ.). 
 139. See id. at 313–20. 
 140. Id. at 320. This deficiency was noted by the dissent. See id. at 339–40 (Powell, J. dissent-
ing dissenting with Berger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J.). It also explains the generally hostile reception the 
opinion received among conflicts scholars. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 150–54; 
WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 626–31, 635–37; Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate 
Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (1981); Roosevelt, su-
pra note 50, at 2505–16, 2528–34; W. Clark Williams, Jr., The Impact of Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Hague on Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 489, 503–06 (1983). 
 141. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 142. 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979). See also Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 
279–86 (1980); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 
456–60 (1982). 
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fendant doing business in a forum cannot be surprised by application of 
the forum’s law given modern choice of law theories.143 This observa-
tion not only assumes the general acceptance of the standard being chal-
lenged, it also assumes unfair surprise is the only unfairness to be con-
sidered. One might almost conclude, therefore, that fairness is simply 
irrelevant to full faith and credit analysis. 
Only four years later, the Supreme Court, by a seven-to-one vote, re-
surrected full faith and credit as a limit on permissible state choice of law 
without, however, providing any greater certainty about its application. 
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,144 in an opinion by Justice William 
Rehnquist, the Court held that Kansas’ decision to apply its own law to a 
class action in which ninety-seven percent of the class members were 
neither residents of Kansas, nor had any contact with Kansas, was a vio-
lation of full faith and credit and due process. Perhaps in order to avoid 
fractionalizing the Court as happened in Allstate, Justice Rehnquist pro-
vided no more precise explanation for his decision than that it was “arbi-
trary” or “fundamentally unfair.”145 His only attempt to define “fairness” 
was to note that an “important element is the expectations of the par-
ties.”146 Justice Stevens dissented on the same grounds as he concurred 
in Allstate.147 The Kansas Supreme Court then somewhat implausibly 
found that the law of the other interested states was the same as that of 
Kansas, and so applied its own law.148 Curiously, when that case reached 
the Supreme Court under the name of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,149 only 
Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist found a willful distortion 
of the laws of other states to be a violation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.150 
Justice Robert Jackson, sixty years ago, best summarized where 
these cases leave us: “[W]e [the Supreme Court] will adopt no rule, per-
mit a good deal of overlapping and confusion, but interfere now and 
then, without imparting to the bar any reason by which the one or the 
 
 143. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 317–18 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion, with Blackmun, Mar-
shall, & White, JJ.), 322–26 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 144. 472 U.S. 797, 815, 818 (1985). 
 145. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13). 
 146. Id. at 822. 
 147. See id. at 823–45. 
 148. Wortman v. Sun Oil Co., 755 P.2d 488, 490–93 (Kan. 1987), aff’d, 486 U.S. 717, 722–30 
(1988). 
 149. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 150. Id. at 743–49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting,with Rehnquist, C.J.,). 
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other course is to be guided or predicted.”151 After Allstate, Nevada v. 
Hall, and Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, it is difficult to imagine a case in 
which a state court’s decision to apply the forum’s law could be held un-
constitutional, and yet lower courts continue to do so,152 at least occa-
sionally, and scholars continue to ponder what it all means, with little 
success.153 
The major alternative to full faith and credit on choice of law is the 
Due Process Clauses.154 Due process as a constraint on choice of law ex-
actly parallels full faith and credit. For a time, Justice John Paul Stevens 
campaigned to develop a distinction between due process and full faith 
and credit as limitations on choice of law.155 He argued that due process 
is a question of fairness, while full faith and credit is concerned with the 
mutual respect due between coequal sovereigns (federalism).156 His the-
ory has had considerable appeal to scholars.157 A few lower courts even 
picked up this distinction.158 Yet every other sitting justice has rejected 
it.159 In recent years, Stevens has not had the opportunity to review his 
 
 151. Jackson, supra note 122, at 27. At the time, Jackson apparently thought this state of af-
fairs was about the best we could hope for. See id. at 26–28 (discussing various options for Supreme 
Court choice-of-law jurisprudence, none of the options providing clear guidance). Jackson did have 
second thoughts and later advocated a more aggressive role for the Supreme Court in policing state 
choice-of-law. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 41–44 (1955). 
 152. See, e.g., McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.), aff’d mem., 454 
U.S. 1071 (1981); de Roburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574, 581–83 (D. Haw. 1979), dismissed on 
other grounds, 548 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Haw. 1982), dismissal rev’d, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985). See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 570–72 
(1996) (dictum). 
 153. See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 145–69; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 
656–82; Brilmayer, supra note 140; Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2509–10; Symposium, supra note 
53; Weinberg, supra note 142; Whitten, supra note 122. 
 154. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
 155. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 837–45 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320–32 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Hughes 
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611–13 (1951). 
 156. 449 U.S. at 320-23. 
 157. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2506–07; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional 
Limitations on State Choice of Law: Due Process, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 851, 906–10 (1982).  
 158. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856–58, 861–62 (App. 
1982); Harlow v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 184 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Me. 1984); Severine v. Ford Aero-
space and Commc’ns Corp., 325 N.W.2d 572, 575–76 (dictum) (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
 159. Seven of eight participating justices agreed that the standards for due process for choice 
of law are the same as the standards for full faith and credit: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797 814–822 (1985), and in Allstate Ins. Co v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10, 333 (1981). See 
also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729–30 n.3 (1988); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 
U.S. 179, 181 (1964). 
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position. There appears to be no basis for challenging the continued 
equivalence of the two major constitutional constraints on choice of law. 
Due process as a constitutional command applies to both state and 
federal exercises of power.160 Unlike full faith and credit, due process is 
not limited to incorrect choices of law among states of the United States, 
but rather seeks to limit arbitrary or irrational applications of government 
power. Due process thus can require the application of the law of a for-
eign nation just as it might require the application of the law of a state of 
the United States.161 As Allstate shows, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently considered fairness and federalism under both due process and full 
faith and credit. The Court, in announcing due process limits in other 
contexts, has also been concerned about both fairness and federalism, al-
though it now seems to discount federalism as a concern in judicial juris-
diction cases.162  
Due process precludes a state from choosing a law not based on leg-
islative jurisdiction over the transaction or event163 in much the same 
manner as it precludes a state from trying a case if the court does not 
have judicial jurisdiction (jurisdiction to adjudicate) over the case.164 
The Supreme Court initially gave content to legislative jurisdiction by 
resorting to the vested rights approach to choice of law.165 As most of 
the early cases involved insurance contracts, some saw in this the mere 
application of now discredited notions of economic substantive due 
process.166 That view was not accurate. Consistent opponents of eco-
 
 160. U.S. CONST. amends. V (the federal government), XIV, § 1 (state governments). 
 161. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08  (1930) (the law of Mexico); American Ba-
nana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (the law of Costa Rica); Slater v. Mexican Nat’l 
RR, 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (the law of Mexico). 
 162. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Cie. des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 (1982). But see 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 
(1980). 
 163. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930); Gerling Global Reinsurance 
Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1236–40 (11th Cir. 2001). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1987). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 147–55, 160–68; 
WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 631–35; Reese, supra note 81. 
 164. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286 (1980). 
 165. See supra p. 1659. 
 166. The very first economic substantive due process case was in fact a choice of law case. 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 
U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 
U.S. 209 (1922); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 
178 U.S. 389 (1900). 
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nomic substantive due process wrote many of the due process cases on 
choice of law.167 Furthermore, the Supreme Court never fully repudiated 
the due process limits on choice of law long after it repudiated economic 
substantive due process.168 But with the standard for due process being 
the same as for full faith and credit, the standard has eroded to the point 
of virtual insignificance.169 Due process as a limitation on choice of law, 
like full faith and credit, has practically died, and its use is likely to be 
similarly intermittent and unpredictable. Only a reversal of field by the 
Supreme Court to begin aggressive policing of the choices of law made 
by lower courts could make either due process or full faith and credit into 
an important limitation on choice of law. While several other clauses in 
the Constitution might also shape choices made under state law,170 those 
other clauses have only rarely been used in litigation, and their use has 
usually been subsumed within the more commonly used clauses.171 
III. ABORTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 
The Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey,172 adopted an “undue burden” standard that promised to 
allow, for the first time in twenty years, major variations among the 
states in their laws regarding abortion. Several conflicts scholars soon 
 
 167. Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., well known for his dissent from economic substan-
tive due process in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), wrote 
the Court’s opinion in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Similarly, 
Justice Louis Brandeis wrote the Court’s opinions in Home Ins. Co v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) and 
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155–60 (1932), applying full faith and credit, in 
contrast to his views on economic substantive due process that he expressed as early as Kryger v. 
Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 168. Contrast the reaffirmation of due process as a check on choice of law in Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814–22, 837–42 (1985); and Allstate Ins. Co v Hague 449 U.S. 
at 307–20, 326–31, 333–36 (1981); with the final, formal, final repudiation of economic substantive 
due process in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
 169. But see Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1236–40 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that Florida’s attempt to regulate European insurance companies violates due 
process because of a lack of legislative jurisdiction). 
 170. For examples under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3, see Edgar v. 
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Black Diamond SS Corp. v. Rob’t Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 
U.S. 386 (1949). For an example under the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, 
see Skahill v. Capitol Airlines, 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), cert. denied 382 U.S. 878 (1965). 
For an example under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 & amend. 
XIV, see Grovey v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 119 S.W.2d 503 (Ark. 1938). Although corporations 
are “persons” under the 14th Amendment, they are not “citizens” and thus are not protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County. 326 U.S. 207, 211–13 (1945).  
 171. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 169–76. See generally  WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, 
at 682–86. 
 172. 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). 
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began to address how courts should resolve the conflicts that were now 
predicted between the laws of different states.173 Conflicts can arise be-
tween the laws of different states in as many different ways as the laws 
regarding abortion are allowed to vary—and they are being allowed to 
vary in ever greater ways.  
We are not yet to the point where abortion might be prohibited in one 
state (with few or no exceptions) and allowed virtually at the demand of 
a pregnant woman in another, but further legal developments could make 
that possible. Such a stark difference will present a conflict in the crimi-
nal laws should a state that prohibits abortion seek to preclude its citizens 
(meaning its residents174) by prosecuting them upon their return from an 
abortion in a permissive state.175 It would also pose a conflict in the civil 
laws should the state seek to enjoin a woman or girl or those aiding the 
woman or girl from going to a more permissive state to obtain an abor-
tion,176 or should interested persons (such as the father) seek to recover 
damages from abortion providers in the permissive state. Leaving a state 
to obtain an abortion has been called abortion tourism.177 
While the conflicts are perhaps less severe, the same questions can 
arise when differences are more subtle; for example, where one state re-
quires parental notice or consent for a minor seeking an abortion and the 
 
 173. C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe is Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of 
Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87 (1993); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Free-
dom . . .” The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993) [herein-
after Kreimer, Right to Travel]; Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, 
the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 NYU L. REV. 451 
(1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, The Law of Choice]. 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 175. See supra pp. 1651-53. The German government has taken steps to enforce its fairly re-
strictive abortion laws against German women who travel to the Netherlands to obtain an abortion 
that would have been illegal in Germany, even including gynecological exams for women returning 
from trips to the Netherlands. Nina Bernstein, Germany Still Divided on Abortion, NEWSDAY, Mar. 
11, 1991, at 5; Karen Y. Crabbs, The German Abortion Debate: Stumbling Block to Unity, 6 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 213, 222–23 (1991); Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 170, at 908 n.5. 
 176. See supra pp. 1651-52. 
 177. See Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors 
Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 939, 942 (1993). Professor Neuman would distinguish 
between a state citizen who travels solely for the purpose of obtaining an abortion and a state citizen 
who has a prolonged presence in another state (perhaps as a student) and who becomes pregnant and 
has an abortion while in the second state. Id. It is possible that courts would make a similar distinc-
tion. Abortion tourism in the strict sense has a long history. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 
572–73, 585, 596–97, 624, 626, 710, 725. Abortion tourism is a subset of the broader phenomenon 
of medical tourism. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a 
Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
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other state does not.178 One can multiply the potential conflicts with 
many other examples. In the remainder of this section, I shall examine 
the conflicts in the starkest terms—prohibition of abortion versus legal-
ized abortion. I do so because such a stark conflict serves to clarify the 
issues, and because lesser levels of conflict will be resolved according to 
the same legal principles. 
A. Criminal Conflicts 
There seem to be few, if any, cases in which a state has attempted to 
apply its criminal laws to prosecute someone based upon an abortion that 
occurred outside the state. Even the Rose Marie Hartford case discussed 
at the opening of this article did not involve prosecuting Ms. Hartford for 
the abortion as such, but for interfering with the custody of a child by 
transporting a girl out of the state without the permission of the parent or 
guardian of the minor.179 The interference occurred, at least initially, 
within Pennsylvania—the state that prosecuted and convicted Ms. Hart-
ford. New Jersey is not likely to extradite the physician who performed 
the abortion or other persons working in the abortion clinic where the 
abortion was performed. It is possible that the physician or other staff 
could simply be arrested upon entering Pennsylvania or another state 
seeking to apply its criminal law to an abortion in another state,180 al-
though this would suppose a level of scrutiny of persons who enter or 
leave a state that is unlikely in practice. 
If a prosecution is to be brought for an abortion in another state, it is 
not likely to be against the abortion tourist herself—a woman resident in 
the state who has gone to another state to obtain an abortion that would 
have been illegal if performed within the state.181 Instead, the prosecu-
tion would likely be against another person (like Ms. Hartford) who fa-
cilitated the out-of-state abortion and who therefore might be indicted as 
an accomplice to the crime of, or committed against, the abortion tour-
ist.182 A state could avoid many of the arguments about the extraterrito-
 
 178. See supra pp. 1652-53. 
 179. See supra pp. 1651-52. 
 180. In one very old case, the state court rejected an attempt to do so. Edge v. State, 99 S.W. 
1098, 1099 (Tenn. 1907). 
 181. Traditionally a woman who underwent an illegal abortion was not guilty of a crime even 
under the most restrictive abortion laws. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 240–41, 299–302, 327, 
544–45. Whether this would continue to be true if Roe were overruled remains to be seen.  
 182. But  see People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1953) (rejecting an attempt to prose-
cute a person who aided women in California to find Mexican abortionists on grounds that the rele-
vant statute required at least an attempt to commit the crime within the state. See Bradford, supra 
note 173, at 99–100. 
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rial application of its laws by making it a crime for a woman resident in a 
state to leave the state in order to obtain an abortion, or to facilitate such 
a woman’s leaving the state in order to obtain an abortion. As with Ms. 
Hartford, the crime would occur within the state and there would be no 
question about criminal jurisdiction.183  
The troubling question lurking in all of this is whether prosecuting 
someone for an abortion that occurred in another state under an expan-
sive reading of the territorial principle or of the personality (nationality) 
principle would violate constitutional limitations on choice of law. This 
is not a question that can be answered simply by applying cases decided 
regarding choice of law in civil litigation, although several commentators 
have attempted to apply those precedents to the criminal law question.184 
One must instead consider precedents regarding criminal prosecutions, 
and there are only a few.  
The case most nearly on point regarding doctors who perform abor-
tions in pro-choice states on residents from pro-life states is Nielsen v. 
Oregon.185 In this case, now nearly a century old, the Supreme Court 
overturned a conviction for fishing in the Columbia River in violation of 
an Oregon statute. The Columbia River, at the point in question, forms 
the boundary of Oregon and Washington, and Congress had enacted that 
the two states should each have concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes 
committed anywhere on the river.186 The defendant was a Washington 
resident who was arrested by Oregon officers while fishing on the Wash-
ington side of the river in a manner that was not only legal under the 
laws of Washington, but had in fact been licensed by the state of Wash-
ington. The Supreme Court acknowledged that either state could, pursu-
ant to the act of Congress, prosecute a crime prohibited by the law of 
both states regardless of the citizenship of the defendant and regardless 
of where the crime was committed,187 but held that Oregon could not 
 
 183. See Bradford, supra note 173, at 97–98. On criminal jurisdiction based on the commis-
sion of a crime (the territorial principle) or the citizenship of the culprit (the personality principle); 
see supra pp. 1667-71. 
 184. See generally Appleton, supra note 37, at 667–77; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federalism 
Doctrines and Abortion Cases: A Response to Professor Fallon, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 767, 771–75, 
791–95 (2007); Bradford, supra note 173, at 109–26, 129–30; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe were 
Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post–Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 626–32; 
Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 477–87; Neuman, supra note 177, at 940–52; Ro-
sen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 728–29. 
 185. 212 U.S. 315 (1909).  
 186. Id. at 316. 
 187. Id. at 320. 
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prosecute an act committed in Washington under a license from that 
state.188 The Court did not indicate the precise basis for its holding. Pre-
sumably, the Court reached its decision because Oregon lacks legislative 
jurisdiction over the act in question.189 
Nielsen v. Oregon precludes prosecution of a physician or other per-
son licensed by the state where the abortion occurs to perform or facili-
tate an abortion in a different state where abortion is a crime. It does not, 
however, reach the question of whether a state could prosecute one of its 
citizens who obtains, or facilitates another citizen of the state in obtain-
ing, an abortion in another state. The question is not whether an allegedly 
criminal act takes place within a state, but whether it takes place within 
the jurisdiction of the state. For residents of the state, the active personal-
ity principle alone would be sufficient to justify a state in applying its 
criminal law.190 And, lest we forget, citizens of the United States are cit-
izens of the state in which they reside.191 
Lea Brilmayer has argued that when there is such a conflict, the law 
of the state where the act or event occurs must trump the law of the per-
son’s residency.192 It is not clear if Brilmayer understands that in this 
context residency means citizenship, which arguably is a stronger contact 
than mere residence in a narrower sense193—even though she herself has 
argued for a communitarian understanding of the authority of a state to 
apply its laws to members of its community.194 There is, in fact, no pre-
 
 188. Id. at 321. 
 189. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930); Gerling Global Reinsurance 
Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1235–40 (11th Cir. 2001). see also supra pp. 114-22, 
129; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 2, 4 (1971); SCOLES ET AL. supra note 19, 
at 147–55, 160–68; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 631–35; Reese, supra note 81. 
 190. See supra pp. 1668-71. 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 192. Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the 
Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 880–89 (1993); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The 
Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973 (2002); Kreimer, Right to 
Travel, supra note 173; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173.  
 193. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at 877–80. 
 194. Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10 (1991); 
see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 173, at 924–38 (similarly dismissing the obligation of 
a state’s citizen to obey the state’s law outside the state despite a recognition, in part, of a communi-
tarian argument for obedience); Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 506, 517 (arguing 
for the primacy of the national community over the local (state) community; this begs the question of 
whether a national community can exist regarding abortion policy if there are no national stan-
dards—as must be the case if states are free to have different abortion laws. But see Mark D. Rosen, 
The Outer Limits of Community Self–Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and 
Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998) (arguing for more nuanced study of 
the limits of a community as a source of law within a larger community). 
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mise in either international law195 or in the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution to support an invariant preference for the territorial 
principle over the personality principle.196 In fact, in one of the few (per-
haps the only) apparently hard and fast rules of choice of law that are 
constitutionally mandated, the “internal affairs rule” for corporate law, 
prefers the law of the “citizenship” of the corporation to the territorial 
principle.197 No wonder Walter Wheeler Cook, a founder of modern con-
flicts theory, could write that “only a blind following of unsound territo-
rial notions would lead to the conclusion” that the application of a state’s 
criminal law extraterritorially would be unconstitutional.198 
Brilmayer recognizes that for several states to have concurrent legis-
lative jurisdiction is routine, but argues that this is impermissible in the 
criminal context because it would expose persons to the risk of uncer-
tainty in the law applicable to their conduct and to double jeopardy in 
 
 195. There is a presumption in U.S. law against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, but 
that is all it is—a presumption. See, e.g., EEOC v.Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
Such a presumption does not preclude the application of U.S. law extraterritorially when the law was 
meant to apply extraterritorially. The decision in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. has been roundly 
criticized as a matter of American law. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial 
Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 180-84, 198-203. 
 196. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 500–04 (1939) 
(approving application of the law of the place of the accident—the territorial principle—to a work-
ers’ compensation claim while expressly approving the Alaska Packers case); Alaska Packers Ass’n 
v. Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 539-43 (1935) (approving application of the law of the resi-
dence of an injured worker when the injury occurred during seasonal employment in Alaska—the 
personality principle); Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
1735 (1988); Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 714–25; Rosen, Extraterritori-
ality, supra note 99. Brilmayer discussed the Alaska Packers case, but she did not mention Pacific 
Employers; she did not consider this line of cases dispositive. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at 882–83; 
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of 
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). See also Regan, supra note 78, for argument in favor 
of the priority of the territorial principle. Regan does acknowledge the legitimacy of a state in regu-
lating its citizens who seek abortions out of the state. Id. at 1908–09, 1912–13. 
 197. See supra p. 1675; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 70-71 
(1987) (upholding the application of Indiana’s Control Share Acquisition law that is conditioned on 
the residence of the stockholders); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 625 (1982) (striking down 
Illinois’ Business Takeover Act regulating hostile tender offers that would apply to a company with 
a connection to Illinois even if no shareholders resided in Illinois). See generally Regan, supra note 
78, at 1876–80 (discussing the several opinions in Edgar v. MITE Corp). 
 198. WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
16 (1949). Kreimer cited this language and dismissed it in a footnote, merely stating that his dis-
agreement with Cook “should not trouble us unduly” because Brainerd Currie also disagreed with 
Cook in some circumstances. Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 484 n.105. But see 
Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 2458–61 (analyzing Cook’s work and its importance in conflicts the-
ory).  
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that they could be prosecuted in more than one jurisdiction.199 Yet the 
law accepts many situations when more than one body of criminal law 
applies to the same conduct,200 creating the very risks that Brilmayer be-
lieves the legal system cannot accept. Brilmayer ultimately offers no rea-
son, other than the possibility of conflicting laws being applicable to a 
single act in a single location to prefer the territorial principle except that 
she prefers it for abortion tourism—apparently because it leads to the de-
cision she prefers.201 So weak is such an argument under choice of law 
theory that those, like Brilmayer, who seek to argue against state author-
ity to apply its criminal law to its citizens who become abortion tourists 
have turned instead to other possible constitutional provisions (most of-
ten the right to travel) that normally have little or nothing to do with 
choice of law in an attempt to bar such an application of a state’s law.202  
The Supreme Court has embraced a constitutional right to travel.203 
The right to travel to some extent derives from the Commerce Clause,204 
but also more directly from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV205 and the Fourteenth Amendment206 and the Due Process 
 
 199. Brilmayer, supra note 194, at 884–86. 
 200. As even Brilmayer acknowledges. Id. at 884 (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87–
93 (1985)). Brilmayer seeks to distinguish cases involving two states each prosecuting for an act that 
is criminal in both states—which she sees as not problematic—from a state prosecuting for an act 
that is not criminal in the state where the act was performed—which she sees as unconstitutional. 
 201. She builds her argument on the assumption that the law of only one state could be ap-
plied, an assumption the correctness of which she simply does not demonstrate. See id. at 884–89. 
 202. Brilmayer invokes the right to travel. Id. at 883; see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra 
note 173; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173. 
 203. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-05 (1999) (denying welfare assistance to persons mov-
ing from other states is barred by a component of the right to travel); Edwards v. California, 314 
U.S. 160, 174 (1941) (striking down, under the commerce clause, a statute prohibiting the transpor-
tation of “paupers” into the state); see Bradford, supra note 173, at 158–65; Rosen, “Hard” or 
“Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 736–37. But see Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth’y Dist. 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 714 (1972) (a tax on persons enplaning at an airport does not 
violate the right to travel because it does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate travel). 
 204. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. On the link between the right to travel and the commerce 
clause, see Bradford, supra note 170, at 156; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 488–
97; Regan, supra note 78, at 1888–89; Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 736–
38. 
 205. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2; see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764–67 (1966) (Har-
lan, J., with Warren, C.J., & Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); see also Brilmayer, supra note 
192, at 881–83; see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 173, at 914–15, 917–18; Kreimer, The 
Law of Choice, supra note 170, at 464–68, 497–519; Metzger, supra note 7, at 1529–31, 1538–41; 
Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 732–37. But see Regan, supra note 78, at 
1889 (arguing that the Privilege and Immunities Clause does not impact right to travel for residents). 
 206. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1; see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908), over-
ruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (listing the right to pass freely from 
state to state as among the privileges of national citizenship); see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, su-
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Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.207 Just how far a state 
can go in interfering with the right to travel is unclear. Impassioned as-
sertions that to allow the law of the state of citizenship to apply its law to 
a citizen while traveling would impair the viability of the union of states 
at best beg the question of constitutionality.208 Sometimes the law of 
one’s citizenship (residence) and the law of the location of an act or 
event will both be applicable.209 That is simply one consequence of liv-
ing in a federal, rather than a unitary, legal system. 
The Supreme Court decisions do not resolve the question of the lim-
its imposed on the application of state law by the right to travel. In Jones 
v. Helms,210 the Supreme Court upheld, against a challenge based on the 
right to travel, a statute making a person who abandons a dependent child 
guilty of a felony if the person leaves the state, but only a misdemeanor 
if the person remains within the state. The Court indicated that at the 
least a state could prohibit travel for a criminal purpose so long as the re-
striction on travel is rationally related to the crime.211 This would seem 
to cover abortion tourism.  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail212 
struck down the extraterritorial enforcement of a state statute prohibiting 
remarriage if a the person was not current with child support obligations 
ordered by a court in that state. The court based its conclusion, however, 
on a finding that the right to marry (not the right to travel213) was “of 
fundamental importance” as an aspect of the right to privacy implicit in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.214 Even with that holding, however, the 
 
pra note 173, at 915, 920; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 504–06; Rosen, “Hard” 
or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 737–40. 
 207. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV § 1. 
 208. This is the line of argument developed by Seth Kreimer. Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra 
note 170, at 914–24. The argument is refuted in Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 99, at 933–45; 
Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 744–59. 
 209. Examples are innumerable. Consider, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92–93 (1985) 
(upholding a conviction in Alabama under Alabama law for kidnapping and murder when the kid-
napping was in Alabama but the murder was in Georgia; the Court indicated that the defendant could 
also have been convicted in Georgia under Georgia law). See generally Rosen, Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 99, at 946–63. 
 210. 452 U.S. 412 (1981); see Bradford, supra note 173, at 159–60. 
 211. Jones, 452 U.S. at 421–23; see generally Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra 
note 99, at 741–43. 
 212. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).  
 213. This is a distinction that Bradford missed. Bradford, supra note 170, at 158 (discussing 
the right to travel, but not mentioning the right to marry). 
 214. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384. 
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Court was careful to indicate that not every regulation of marriage would 
be subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review.215 Today, the right to 
an abortion is not a fundamental right.216 It seems unlikely that a future 
Supreme Court that would loosen Roe v. Wade sufficiently to give rise to 
such a conflict would find that the right to travel prevents a state from 
enforcing its laws against its citizens.217 
The Supreme Court has, on at least two occasions, addressed the 
right to travel in the context of abortion. In Doe v. Bolton,218 the majority 
struck down, as an impairment of the right to travel, the section of a stat-
ute that mandated abortions only be performed on residents of the state. 
This provision amounted to discrimination against non-residents of the 
state in accessing medical services in the state,219 while a prohibition of 
a resident obtaining an abortion in another state does not work any such 
discrimination. Doe also arose at a time when the right to an abortion 
was held to be a fundamental right.220 Arguably, the import of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in substituting an 
undue burden standard for the former strict scrutiny, is to indicate that 
abortion is not a fundamental right.221 That position was taken explicitly 
in the concurring and dissenting opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist.222 If the right to abortion is still a fundamental right, a 
state can hardly argue that it has a compelling interest in preventing non-
residents from obtaining an abortion that it allows to residents, but it 
might have a compelling interest in protecting fetuses within the state 
from abortions wherever they occur.223 The closest we come to a case on 
 
 215. Id. at 386. See generally Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 742–44. 
 216. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (1992). 
 217.  See Fallon, supra note 184, at 638–40 (discussing the potential impact of the right to tra-
vel on abortion laws). 
 218. 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973). 
 219. Bradford, supra note 170, at 163. 
 220. Id. 
 221. 505 U.S. 833, 874–87, 895, 901 (plurality opinion, per O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, 
JJ), 920–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 222. Id. at 950–54. 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., with Scalia, Thomas, & White, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 223. But see Virginia v. Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809, 811–12, 824 (1975) (stating in dictum, in a 
case striking down a statute prohibiting the advertising of out-of-state abortions, that a state could 
not prevent its residents from traveling to another state to obtain an abortion). Most scholars have 
concluded that the statement in Bigelow is dictum. See generally Bradford, supra note 173, at 163–
65; Fallon, supra note 184, at 629; Regan, supra note 78, at 1907–08; Rosen, Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 99, at 891, 969–72; Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 723–25. Con-
tra: Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 459 n.27. On a state’s interest in preventing 
abortions, see Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833, 869–79 (1992) (plurality opinion per O’Connor, 
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point is Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,224 in which a major-
ity of the Court declined to find a violation of the right to travel when the 
purpose of the interference was to prevent abortions and not to interfere 
with travel as such. Justice John Paul Stevens, in dissent, asserted that a 
woman’s right to travel to obtain an abortion is protected by the Consti-
tution, but only Justice Harry Blackmun joined this opinion.225 
Apart from the right to travel, the Commerce Clause itself could 
have an effect on the application of abortion statutes to acts in another 
state. The so-called dormant commerce clause will bar the application of 
state laws that discriminate against or improperly burden interstate com-
merce.226 A prohibition of a state’s citizens obtaining an abortion regard-
less of where it occurs is not likely to be held to discriminate against in-
terstate commerce.227 So long as an abortion statute does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, it will be upheld as a statute 
directed at legitimate local concerns so long as the benefits to the state’s 
interests clearly outweigh the incidental effects the statute might have on 
interstate commerce.228 Special weight is given to state regulations when 
the regulations are designed to protect the health or safety of its citi-
zens.229  
As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote on behalf of a majority of the 
Supreme Court in 2007, the Commerce Clause “is not a roving license 
for federal courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and 
local governments to undertake, and what activities must be the province 
of private market competition.”230 Substitute “personal choice” for the 
 
Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (plurality 
opinion per Rehnquist, C.J., with White & Kennedy, JJ.). 
 224. 506 U.S. 263, 274–78 (1993).  
 225. Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., with Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 226. United Haulers Ass’n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct. 1786, 
1792–93 (2007). See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001). 
 227. Bradford, supra note 173, at 156–57; Fallon, supra note 184, at 636–38; Rosen, “Hard” 
or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 726–30. 
 228. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., with Souter, Ginsberg, & Beyer, JJ.; 
Thomas J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Incl. 397 U.S. 137, 142 
(1970)); see also Nw. Cent. Pipeline Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 525–26 
(1989); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See generally Bellia, supra 
note 184, at 775–76; Bradford, supra note 173, at 148–57; Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, 
supra note 99, at 727–30. For an extended argument against balancing, see Regan, supra note 78, at 
1866–68. 
 229. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); City of Philadelphia, 
437 U.S. at 623–24. 
 230. United Haulers Ass’n, 127 S.Ct. at 1796. 
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phrase “private market competition,” and there seems to be little problem 
with a state applying its abortion laws to its own citizens under the 
Commerce Clause.231 The Commerce Clause by itself might preclude the 
application of a state’s abortion statute to non-residents who do no act 
within the state.232 Just how far this last limitation extends is not 
clear,233 but combine it with the holding in Nielsen234 (old as it is), and 
the conclusion that a state cannot apply its abortion statute to a person 
who performs or facilitates an abortion outside the state while perform-
ing no act within the state becomes pretty firm.235 
In searching for a constitutional basis for denying the legislative ju-
risdiction of the state of citizenship, Steven Bradford has even argued 
that states cannot charge someone with a crime committed within another 
state because it would be impossible to empanel a jury drawn from the 
vicinage of the crime.236 That might be true in states that have embedded 
a right to a jury from the vicinage in their constitutions.237 For those 
states, the question is how strictly they will construe the definition of the 
crime being prosecuted.238 After all, while the U.S. Constitution requires 
 
 231. Bradford, supra note 173, at 149–53; cf. Riis v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 396, 397–
98 (Ky. 1967) (upholding, against a commerce clause challenge, a statute prohibiting transporting a 
person out of state against her will ). 
 232. See Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 492–94; Rosen, Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 99, at 919–30; Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 726–27; cf. Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310–11 (1992) (barring a state from imposing a tax on an out-
of-state vendor who does nothing within the state except send products through the mail); Healy v. 
Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989) (striking down a statute that applied to pricing outside 
the state’s border). Whether Congress could authorize such state regulation of out-of-state conduct is 
another question. See Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra, at 727. 
 233. See generally Bradford, supra note 170, at 153–57; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra 
note 170, at 488–97. 
 234. See supra pp. 1685-86. 
 235. This is the point that Brilmayer seeks to make the basis of her argument that the territorial 
state must always prevail in a conflict with the laws of the state of residence. Brilmayer, supra note 
192, at 889–903. She goes too far in seeking to apply it in contexts where the state has not affirma-
tively licensed the conduct in question. See also Appleton, supra note 38, at 673. 
 236. See Bradford, supra note 173, at 137–47; see also Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 
170, at 921–24 (arguing for the application of strictly territorial jurisdiction over criminal matters 
based on various grounds related to the need to try the case where it arose); Kreimer, The Law of 
Choice, supra note 173, at 466 (citing the local jury requirement as a limitation on state criminal 
jurisdiction). Gerald Neuman, however, has expressed considerable skepticism about the relevance 
of the vicinage principle. Neuman, supra note 177, at 941. 
 237. According to Bradford, at least fourteen states have no such provision. Bradford, supra 
note 173, at 141. The states that Bradford lists are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, 
Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, and 
West Virginia. Id. 
 238. Depending on how the crime is defined, usually at least part of the crime will have oc-
curred in the state, and thus there in fact might be no problem under the vicinage requirement. Cf. 
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a jury of the vicinage,239 it also expressly provides for the trial of federal 
crimes occurring outside of any state240—effectively, outside the United 
States. Moreover, every court but one that has considered the question 
has concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a jury of the 
vicinage does not apply to the states.241 
The possibility of a state applying its law to an abortion tourist or to 
a resident who facilitates the efforts of an abortion tourist can easily be 
evaded by simply taking up residence in the state where the abortion is 
sought.242 This, of course, is not as easy as it sounds. Such a change of 
residence could be challenged in the state of prior residence as a sham, 
leaving the defendant exposed to the risk of conviction there.243 Thus, 
while a change of residence can be instantaneous,244 to make certain that 
it will not be held to be a sham, any purported change of residence will 
require living there for some time and at least going through the motions 
of starting a new life there—establishing an address, looking for or tak-
ing a job, enrolling in school, securing a new driver’s license, etc. Such 
things are possible, of course, but they will raise the price beyond the 
means of many, or perhaps most, women who would like to be an abor-
 
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 94 (1985) (upholding a conviction in Alabama under Alabama law 
for kidnapping and murder when the kidnapping was in Alabama but the murder was in Georgia); 
United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408–09 (1958) (holding that an alien charged with overstaying 
his landing permit committed the crime in each district in which he stayed after his permit expired). 
A few lower court cases have found that venue lay in the district with the more substantial contacts, 
but this is not a holding that only the most interested district has jurisdiction. See United States v. 
Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th 
Cir. 1986). Bradford disregards the limited import of these decisions. Bradford, supra note 170, at 
146–47. 
 239. U.S. CONST., amend. VI. 
 240. Id. art. III, § 2.  
 241. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 593, 595 
(5th Cir. 1986); Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Trindle v. State, 602 
A.2d 1232, 1238–39 (Md. 1992) (Eldridge, J., dissenting in part), overturned on other grounds; 
Commonwealth v. Duteau, 424 N.E.2d 1119, 1126 (Mass. 1981) (dictum); State v. Darroch, 287 
S.E.2d 856, 859–60 (N.C. 1982); State v. Beuke, 526 N.E.2d 274, 288 (Ohio 1988); State v. Paiz, 
817 S.W.2d 84, 85–86 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1991); see Fallon, supra note 184, at 635–36. Contra: 
Mississippi Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987).  
 242. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302–03 (1942); see Fallon, supra note 182, at 
639–40; Regan, supra note 78, at 1909. 
 243. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945) (upholding a conviction for big-
amy after the state court found that the purported Nevada residence was a sham). 
 244. A change of residence (or domicile) occurs when physical presence is combined with the 
intent to make the place one’s home. See, e.g., In re Jones’ Estate, 182 N.W. 227, 234 (Iowa 1921); 
White v. Tennant, 8 S.E. 596, 597 (W. Va. 1888). 
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tion tourist.245 And even for women who could afford to do so, it would 
be a significant burden.246 
B. Civil Conflicts 
Apart from possible criminal prosecutions regarding out-of-state 
abortions, significant civil litigation concerning abortion could arise if 
the Supreme Court continues to loosen its standards regarding the per-
missible scope for different state laws. Civil litigation could involve suits 
for an injunction against an abortion or the appointment of a guardian for 
the fetus to approve or prevent an abortion. Or someone who has under-
gone an abortion could later seek to recover for injuries for malpractice 
in the performance of the abortion. Each of these suits would require its 
own distinct analysis under choice of law theory. 
Injunctions could be sought either by a public officer or by an inter-
ested private person. Perhaps the best known example of such an injunc-
tion is Attorney General v. X,247 a case brought in Ireland to enjoin an 
adolescent girl from going to England for an abortion. Such a suit, al-
though technically on the civil side of a court docket, really is a matter of 
public law and implicates the same policy concerns that arise in criminal 
litigation.248 A suit by the father or other relative of the fetus to enjoin an 
abortion,249 however, is a form of private litigation and the applicable 
 
 245. Brilmayer, supra note 192, at 879. On the effects of costs on the ability of women to ob-
tain abortions, see Carol Joffe, Physician Provision of Abortion before Roe v. Wade, 9 RES. SOC. 
HEALTH CARE 21, 28–30 (1991); Steven Polgar & Ellen S. Fried, The Bad Old Days: Clandestine 
Abortions among the Poor in New York City before Liberalization of the Abortion Law, 8 FAMILY 
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 125, 126 (1976). 
 246. The burden might be so significant as to be an “undue burden.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 
S.Ct. 1610, 1626–27 (2007).  
 247. [1992] 1 I.R. 1; see generally THE ATTORNEY GENERAL V. X AND OTHERS: JUDGMENTS OF 
THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT WITH SUBMISSIONS MADE BY COUNSEL TO THE SUPREME 
COURT (S. McDonaugh ed. 1992); Marie Fox & Therese Murphy, Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in 
a Jurisprudence of Doubt and Delegation, 19 J. LAW & SOC’Y 454, 455 (1992);  Ailbhe Smyth, The 
“X” Case: Women and Abortion in the Republic of Ireland, 1992, 1 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 163 
(1993); Paul Ward, Ireland: Abortion: “X” + “Y” = ?!, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 385 (1995). 
 248. See Bradford, supra note 170, at 92–95; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 
457–58. 
 249. Such suits thus far have been rejected by courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308, 
1308–09 (1988); Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d mem., 526 N.E.2d 
958 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); see also Robin Powers Morris, Note, The 
Corneau Case, Furthering the Trends of Fetal Rights and Religious Freedom, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 91–98 (discussing a case in which a woman was kept in custody in 
a hospital because she declined to have medical assistance with her pregnancy because of her 
religious views). 
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law would be determined by the usual choice of law approaches applica-
ble to civil litigation. 
Injunctions or other equitable relief depend entirely on personal ju-
risdiction over the person (natural or artificial) subject to the court or-
der.250 Even the restrictive view of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. 
Neff251 allowed a court exercising equitable powers to order a person 
subject to the court’s jurisdiction to do or to refrain from doing some-
thing in another jurisdiction. Thus so long as the abortion tourist or 
someone aiding the abortion tourist is still within the state, a court could 
order the person not to leave the state and not to have, or facilitate, an 
abortion in another state so long as the law of the forum would allow 
such an order. Generally speaking, the person subject to the order from a 
state court could leave the state and ignore the order, for generally such 
orders will not be recognized or enforced in another state.252 If one can 
obtain the injunction from a federal court, the evasion problem is largely 
avoided because federal court injunctions have nationwide effect, even if 
the injunction is issued based upon state law grounds.253 The person sub-
ject to the order could not return to the state without being subject to 
punishment for contempt of court.254  
Suits for damages could arise in highly varied circumstances, many 
of which would run contrary to the policy of a state with a different ap-
proach to abortion than the state in which the suit is brought. A father or 
other relative could seek damages from the mother, the abortionist, or 
 
 250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971). See generally DAN B. 
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.3 (abridged ed. 1993); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 1155–59; 
Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747 (1998).  
 251. 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877). 
 252. State court equitable orders are not entitled to full faith and credit in another state, if only 
because the orders are modifiable in the state where they originated. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 
U.S. 1, 6–10 (1909); Meenach v. General Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Ky. 1995). The ma-
jority in Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234,239 (1998), declared in dictum that equi-
table decrees were entitled to full faith and credit between the actual parties to the litigation in which 
the decree was entered, but did not require the court in another state to enforce the injunction when 
important interests in that other state would be impaired. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 1156; 
Price, supra note 250, at 761–81, 791–92; Kaleen S. Hasegawa, Casenote, Re-Evaluating the Limits 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause after Baker v. General Motors Corporation, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 
747, 754–60 (1999). 
 253. See,e.g,, Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (trademark dilu-
tion claims); see generally Price, supra note 248, at 786–91 (same). Contra: Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 
Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 854 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985). Such 
orders could still be evaded by departing for another country. 
 254. Burt v. Dodge, 599 N.E.2d 693, 695 (Ohio 1992); see DOBBS, supra note 248, § 1.1 at 5, 
1.4, at 13–14. 
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anyone who facilitated the abortion.255 A pro-life or pro-choice activist 
could sue for defamation by someone on the other side of the abortion 
controversy.256 A child born with injuries from an unsuccessful abortion 
could sue the abortionist or others involved in the attempt.257 Perhaps 
less policy diversity would confront suits where a woman who under-
went an abortion was injured through malpractice by the abortionist.258 
In delineating the types of suits possible, imagination is the only limit. 
In contrast to the uncertain enforceability of an equitable order, a 
judgment for money damages must be enforced in every state under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.259 The conflicts problems arise only before 
a judgment is entered—when the court chooses the law to be applied in 
the litigation. That in turn depends upon which of the three different ap-
proaches to choice of law the court follows.260 
The vested rights approach would generally preclude a damages 
award against persons involved in abortion tourism. The court would 
have to characterize the claim according to whether it was one for tort, 
contract, property, or status, but generally for any of these characteriza-
tions, the court would apply the law of the place where the abortion took 
 
 255. Cf. Doe v. Smith 486 U.S. 1308 (1988) (rejecting a father’s suit to enjoin an abortion); see 
also MO. REV. STAT. § 188.250 (Supp. 2007) (authorizing the parents to recover damages against 
any person who causes, aids, or assists a minor in obtaining an out-of-state abortion). 
 256. See, e.g., Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2000); cf. Appleton, 
supra note 38, at 680–81 (discussing free speech concerns in attempts to ban advertising for out-of-
state abortions); Fallon, supra note 182, at 641–46 (same). 
 257. See, e.g., Cherry v. Borsman, 75 D.L.R.4th 668 (B.C. S. Ct. 1991); see DELLAPENNA, 
supra note 15, at 668. 
 258. See, e.g., Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurigico, 345 F.3d 15, 18–19 (1st Cir. 
2003); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Perguson v. Tamis, 937 P.2d 347 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1984); Atlanta Obstetrics v. Coleman, 398 
S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1990); Adams v. Family Planning Assocs. Med. Group, 733 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000); Collins v. Thakkar, 552 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Kiddy v. Lipscomb, 628 So. 2d 
1355 (Miss. 1993); Eidson v. Reproductive Health Servs., 863 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); 
Blackburn v. Blue Mt. Women’s Clinic, 951 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1997); Ferrara v. Bernstein, 613 N.E.2d 
542 (N.Y. 1993); Phillips v. Triangle Women’s Health Clinic, 573 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); 
Davis v. Fieker, 952 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1997); Hunte v. Hinkley, 731 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987); Lake v. Northern Va. Women’s Med. Ctr., 483 S.E.2d 220 (Va. 1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
1531(c) (Supp. IV 2004) (authorizing suit for damages on behalf of the father or, under some cir-
cumstances, of the maternal grandparents for the loss of a child through a partial-birth abortion; the 
statute does not indicate whether the suit is to be against the mother, the abortionist, or both). 
 259. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); see SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 
1159–87; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 737–46; William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith 
and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 412–13 (1994) (“This basic rule is so clear and so strong that it 
might be called the ‘Iron Law’ of Full Faith and Credit.”). 
 260. See supra pp. 1658-64 . 
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place.261 A court in the resident state of the abortion tourist might de-
cline to follow the law of the place of the abortion on grounds that to do 
so would violate public policy,262 but that would not allow the state to 
substitute its own law in the suit—at least in the classic formulation of 
the public policy rule.263 Other escape devices are no more likely to be 
effective. 
Courts adhering to one or another form of interest analysis have 
more possibilities open to them. Courts would have to analyze the poli-
cies involved in the competing laws and determine whether there is no 
conflict, a false conflict, or a true conflict.264 If there is no conflict or a 
false conflict, the resolution of the choice of law problem is easy.265 For 
true conflicts, the court would select one or another of the proffered 
bases for resolving true conflicts.266  
The resident state of the abortion tourist has an interest in protecting 
and regulating its citizen267 and also in fostering respect for life in the 
form of unborn children located, at least for a time, within its borders.268 
Similarly, the state where the abortion takes place has an interest in regu-
lating or allowing abortions and in protecting persons who seek or pro-
 
 261. Defamation suits would be more difficult to localize. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television 
Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 483–85 (3rd Cir. 1956); Schumann v. Loew’s Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 
354–68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A reporter’s note (1977); 
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 802–03; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 457–61; Albert E. Ehrenz-
weig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason versus the Restatement, 
36 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33–35 (1951). 
 262. See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) (“[Courts] do not close 
their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent concep-
tion of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”); see also SCOLES ET AL., 
supra note 19, at 139–41; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 106–12. 
 263. See, e.g., Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799–800 (N.Y. 
1938) (disallowing public policy as a basis for applying the forum’s law when nothing connected 
with the case occurred within the forum state). But see Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 
553, 560–61 (2nd Cir. 1962);Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527–29 (N.Y. 
1961). See generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 19, at 140; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 100–01, 
109–11, 683–84. 
 264. See supra p 1661. 
 265. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284–85 (N.Y. 1963). 
 266. See supra p. 1661. I leave aside the question of whether “the unprovided for case” should 
be treated the same way as a false conflict of a true conflict. 
 267.  See Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 718–25; cf. Tooker v. Lopez, 
249 N.E.2d 394, 399–403 (N.Y. 1969) (applying New York law to an accident in Michigan involv-
ing a New York domiciliary riding in a vehicle registered in New York and driven by another New 
York domiciliary). This interest exists even if, as Susan Appleton argues, abortion is about enforcing 
gender roles rather than about protecting fetuses. Appleton, supra note 37, at 660–67. 
 268. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2007); see also Morris, supra note 247, at 
99–100. 
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vide abortions within its borders.269 So long as the abortion statutes can 
be fairly construed as expressing policies that promote these interests,270 
the resulting conflict will be a true conflict—even in suits against per-
sons who did no relevant act within the jurisdiction of the particular 
state.271 However a court resolves these often contentious questions, the 
marked bias in favor of applying forum law272 probably means that each 
court would apply its own law and the plaintiff could effectively pick the 
law by picking the forum. This conclusion might be different, however, 
if the defendant were, for example, a student from an pro-life state who 
has been studying for several years in a pro-choice state, and who be-
came pregnant and had the abortion there even while retaining a techni-
cal domicile in the pro-life state.273 
Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer have argued that all courts must 
choose the law most favorable to freedom of choice for abortion.274 
While a court might reach that conclusion, particularly a court in a state 
whose policy favors freedom of choice, their view is too optimistic if suit 
is brought in a state that disfavors freedom of choice. Brilmayer (a con-
flicts scholar) at least sought to develop some sort of interest analysis to 
support her conclusion.275 As Gerald Neuman noted, a view such as 
Brilmayer’s “gives excessive attention to the power of territorial states 
based on the location of particular acts while neglecting the jurisdictional 
implications of the relationships among those involved in the acts.”276 
Kreimer (who repeatedly noted that he is not a conflicts scholar) simply 
asserted that the interest analysis cases “acknowledge the power of the 
law of the place where primary conduct occurs to determine its basic 
 
 269. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (summary reversal without argument of 
an injunction against enforcement of Montana’s requirement that abortions be performed by a li-
censed physician); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding 
state regulations of abortion clinics), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1191 (2001), further appeal, 317 F.3d 
357 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1008 (2003). See also DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 
716. 
 270. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 37, at 678–82. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legis-
lative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 753 (2006). 
 271. Cf. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 443–47 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying New York law 
against a Massachusetts physician who did no relevant act in New York). This leaves aside the ques-
tion of whether the court can obtain personal jurisdiction over the person who did no relevant act 
within the state. 
 272. See supra pp. 1661. 
 273. This possibility was first pointed out by Professor Neuman. Neuman, supra note 177, at 
942. 
 274. Brilmayer, supra note 194, at 897–903; Kreimer, Right to Travel, supra note 173, at 913–
24; Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 170. 
 275. Brilmayer, supra note 194, at 897–903. 
 276. Neuman, supra note 177, at 950–51. 
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permissibility or wrongfulness.”277 Nothing could be further from the 
truth. 
Neoterritorialism puts greater emphasis on the place where the con-
duct in question occurred, but not absolutely so.278 Where the parties 
share the same domicile and the basis of the suit implicates compensa-
tory policies rather than admonitory rules, the court will apply the law of 
the common domicile.279 For most of the possible suits arising out of 
abortions, courts are likely to conclude that the rules are admonitory,280 
but one can hardly be certain. 
Finally, the constitutional limitations on choice of law are simply not 
likely to affect a court’s decision in these matters.281 Unless the court 
chooses the law of a state without substantial contact with the parties or 
the acts or events, the constitutional limitations simply have no role to 
play.282 Both the state that is the location of the act in question283 and the 
state that is the residence of one or more of the persons involved in the 
litigation have a substantial connection with the litigation.284 Thus a 
court would be justified, even as against non-residents, in applying its 
own law to resolve a suit for damages.285 Even if a court were to choose 
to apply a law unrelated to the parties, the act, or the forum, the choice 
can only be challenged on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and not collaterally attacked in resisting enforcement of 
the judgment in another state.286 
 
 277. Kreimer, The Law of Choice, supra note 173, at 482. He developed his analysis at length 
in id. at 472–87. 
 278. See supra pp. 1663-64. 
 279. First Nat’l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 319 (Colo. 1973); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 685–87 (N.Y. 1985). See supra p. 1663-64. 
 280. See Cross, supra note 75 (discussing how courts determine whether a law is admoni-
tory—conduct regulating). 
 281. See supra pp. 1673-82. 
 282. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985). 
 283. Watson v. Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp, 348 U.S. 66, 71–73 (1954); P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. 
Camp Jaycee, 922 A.2d 761, 765–66 (N.J. App. Div. 2007), cert.. granted, 927 A.2d 1293 (N.J. 
2007). 
 284. Cf. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412–14 (1955); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Acc. Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 497–501 (1939). See generally Appleton, supra note 37, at 671–72; 
Rosen, Extraterritoriality, supra note 99, at 871–76. 
 285. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?, supra note 99, at 718–25. 
 286. Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1939). See SCOLES ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 1143–46; WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 741–46. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
To the extent that the Supreme Court backs off from being the su-
preme medical review board for abortion policy and allows states to en-
act divergent statutes regulating, restricting, or perhaps even prohibiting 
abortion, conflicts between state laws are bound to arise. So long as some 
states have less restrictive laws than other states, there will be women 
willing and able to become abortion tourists287—and even in the unlikely 
event that all states in the United States were to prohibit abortion, there 
will be abortion tourists going to other countries.288 The resulting con-
flicts of law will focus primarily on efforts to apply the law of the state 
of her residence to the abortion tourist or, more likely, to a person who 
facilitates the abortion tourist in obtaining an abortion given the unlikeli-
hood that states will treat a woman who obtains an abortion as a crimi-
nal.289  
While the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the state of the abor-
tion tourist’s residence most likely will be able to apply its criminal law 
even though the abortion is legal in the state where it is performed.290 
The resident state of the abortion tourist cannot apply its criminal law to 
persons who reside outside the state for actions lawful at the place of per-
formance.291 Furthermore, the resident state of the abortion tourist may 
apply its civil law even to residents of other states.292 On the other hand, 
the persons who might be subjected to an abortion law that they are seek-
ing to escape from can do so by establishing a new residence at the place 
where they obtain the abortion—even if they resume their former resi-
dence subsequent to the abortion.293 If these conclusions are correct, leg-
islators in states that seek to restrict access to abortion should consider 
carefully whether to extend its laws extraterritorially to activities involv-
ing its residents. 
 
 
 
 287. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 15, at 572–73, 585, 596–97, 624, 626, 710, 725. 
 288. One of the major incidents that fueled the abortion reform movement was the well-
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at pre-school children called “Romper Room”─to Sweden to obtain an abortion of a thalidomide 
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